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I. INTRODUCTION 
Incentive-laden executive compensation arrangements have 
generated enormous paydays for many executives.  The oft-staggering 
amounts awarded to many executives had their genesis in the rise of the 
celebrity chief executive officers in the aftermath of the leveraged 
buyouts that were common in the 1980s.1  Tax law changes in 1993 and 
the reticence of accounting standard setters to mandate a full accounting 
of certain types of equity-based compensation contributed to the 
proliferation of equity-based incentive schemes with the potential for 
 
* Professor of Law, Lehigh University Perella Dep’t. of Finance, Bethlehem, PA.  
 1. See Daniel Altman, How to Tie Pay to Goals, Instead of the Stock Price, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 8, 2002, at BU 4. Public opprobrium at outsized executive compensation has a long history.  
See Alan Brinkely, Class Warfare: Railing Against the Rich: A Great American Tradition, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 7, 2009, at W1.  
1
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enormous payouts.2  The accounting scandals that came to light in the 
early part of this decade, the most prominent of which were perpetrated 
by Enron and WorldCom, and the accompanying public outrage led to 
legislative reforms in 2002.3  These reforms have done little to curb 
executive compensation.  Executive compensation has continued to 
escalate, the gap between the top and average earners has continued to 
widen, and pay practices have retained their ability to both amaze and 
repulse the public.4  
It is likely that had someone been told in 2006 that, within a few 
years, Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns would no longer exist as 
independent entities; the two mortgage giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, would be placed into conservatorship; Lehman Brothers would file 
bankruptcy and liquidate; and that the federal governments would loan 
billions of dollars to auto companies, banks, and insurance companies, 
her reaction would have been either incredulity or sheer terror.  The 
economic catastrophe that was 2008 has, at least up to this point, created 
a sea change in the attitudes toward executive compensation.  The near 
collapse of the financial system and its effect on the broader economy 
 
 2. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13211, 107 Stat. 
312, 469-70 (1993) added section 162(m) to the Internal Revenue Code.  This provision limits the 
deductibility of compensation paid by publicly traded corporations to the chief executive officer and 
the next four highest paid officers to $1 million per executive. However, excepted from this 
restriction is performance-based compensation which includes cash bonuses based on performance 
metrics, stock options, and certain other forms of equity-based compensation.  In addition, generally 
accepted accounting principles did not require, until very recently, an issuer of most compensatory 
stock options to record compensation expense as a result of such issuances.  See Matthew A. 
Melone, Are Compensatory Stock Options Worth Reforming?, 38 GONZAGA L. REV. 535, 543-44, 
554-58 (2003). See also infra note 250 and accompanying text.  
 3. See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.  
 4. Between 1947 and 1979 the top 0.1% of earners in the United States were paid 
approximately twenty times as much as the average of the bottom 90% of earners. By 2006 the 20:1 
ratio had grown to 77:1.  More or Less Equal?, Special Report on the Rich, ECONOMIST, April 4, 
2009, at 11.  According to a Wall Street Journal analysis of Social Security Administration data, 
approximately one-third of all earnings in 2007 were earned by highly compensated employees—
those whose wages exceeded the old age, survivor, and disability payroll tax base.  The Wall Street 
Journal’s analysis actually understates the percentage of income that flowed to highly compensated 
employees because the data did not include the value of incentive stock options, unexercised 
nonqualified stock options, and unvested restricted stock.  Ellen E. Schultz, Pay of Top Earners 
Erodes Social Security, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2009, at C4.  See also Cari Tuna, Plush Perks Keep 
Flowing Despite Outcry, WALL ST. J., April 3, 2009, at B1; Jonathan D. Glater, Stock Options Are 
Adjusted After Many Share Prices Fall, N.Y. TIMES, March 27, 2009, at B1; Shelly Banjo, 
Corporate News: Stock Options Are Ailing, but Aren’t Dead, WALL ST. J., March 18, 2009, at B2.  
One type of pay practice caused considerable angst among the public – the payment of taxes for 
executives on certain perks.  This practice, the so-called tax gross-up, has been under considerable 
pressure of late.  See Cari Tuna, Firms End Key Benefit for Executives, WALL ST. J., April 21, 2009, 
at B1. 
2
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has boiled over an already simmering public, generating a level of public 
anger that is more focused and intense than anything that has preceded it 
– at least in this author’s lifetime.5  One scholar presciently stated, 
“[c]hanging the business and financial culture by moving it away from 
the self-interest ideology will take time, and it may take a financial 
catastrophe to upset the status quo and lead people to question the 
dominant perspective.”6  The financial catastrophe arrived, and the 
extent of its damage has led to unprecedented federal intervention in the 
financial system and other areas of the economy.7  Much of the blame 
for our current economic situation has been placed squarely on 
compensation practices that critics assert encouraged inordinate risk-
taking, were too focused on short-term results, and resulted in private 
gain but socialized losses.8  
In response, the federal government has, both legislatively and 
administratively, interjected itself in the compensation arena to an extent 
that would have been inconceivable a few years ago.9  Moreover, such 
federal intervention and the massive losses suffered by investors have 
emboldened shareholders to take a more proactive role in the executive-
compensation process.10  Boards of directors, in turn, have begun to take 
a more adversarial approach with executives in crafting compensation 
 
 5. Compensation practices are by no means the sole factor upon which blame is laid for the 
current economic situation.  See, e.g., When a Flow Become A Flood, ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 2009, at 
74-76 (discussing the United States’ meager savings rate and large trade imbalance); Greed - and 
Fear, ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 2009, at 3 (positing that the failure of mathematical models to 
adequately assess risk and regulatory failures were also contributing causes).  The opinion that 
compensation practices contributed to economic crisis is by no means universally held. See Floyd 
Norris, It May Be Outrageous, but Wall Street Pay Didn’t Cause This Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 
2009, at B1 (referring to an academic study that concludes that bank C.E.O. incentives were not to 
blame for credit crisis or poor bank performance).   
 6. James Fanto, A Social Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 517, 525 
(2007). 
 7. A recent Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll found that 69 percent of respondents were 
either greatly concerned or quite a bit concerned about the federal government’s role in the 
economy.  See Laura Meckler, Public Wary of Deficit, Economic Intervention, WALL ST. J., June 
18, 2009, at A1.  Widespread federal government intrusion in the economy would be expected to 
displease advocates for the self-correcting properties of free markets, but it has also provided fodder 
for an apparently growing devolutionist movement.  See Paul Starobin, Divided We Stand, WALL 
ST. J., June 13, 2009, at W1 (reporting on growing secessionist sentiments in Texas, Alaska, and 
Vermont). 
 8. See Gretchen Morgenson, Gimme Back Your Paycheck, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at 
BU1. 
 9. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 10. See Morgenson, supra note 8. 
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arrangements.11  As a result, a portion of executive compensation 
increasingly has become subject to clawback provisions.  Such 
provisions entitle the employer to recoup compensation paid or 
discharge the obligation to pay compensation in the event that, with the 
benefit of hindsight, such compensation was not earned.12  Clawback 
provisions are not new.  Certain officers of publicly traded companies 
have been subject to such provisions since 2002.13  Contractual 
clawbacks have been used in limited settings for some time, and long-
standing common law remedies have been available to employers under 
appropriate circumstances.14  Federal legislation enacted in 2008 and 
2009 has broadened the scope of such provisions.15  Moreover, 
corporations have begun to incorporate such provisions in their 
executive compensation schemes with greater frequency.16  
The repayment or forfeiture of compensation raises a myriad of tax 
issues for the affected executives.  The federal income tax system 
operates on the basis of an annual accounting period.17  The fact that 
compensation is taxed in one period and repaid or forfeited in a 
subsequent period will not, almost assuredly, result in tax neutrality.  In 
addition to time value of money issues, the tax benefits attributable to 
the repayment or forfeiture of compensation will depend on various 
factors that may, or may not, place the executive in a position closely 
approximating the tax posture that such an executive would have found 
herself in had the compensation not been subject to tax in the first place.  
 
 11. See, e.g., Aaron Lucchetti, Goldman’s Blankfein Calls For Pay Change, WALL ST. J., 
April 8, 2009, at C3; Kathryn Jones, Who Moved My Bonus?, N.Y. TIMES, April 5, 2009, at BU1; 
Phred Dvorak & Joann S. Lublin, Firms Rethink Compensation Plans, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2009, 
at B1.  
 12. Compensation based on the attainment of certain metrics, such as earnings, earnings per 
share, revenue, and the like may ultimately have not been earned if such metrics are required to be 
restated.  This is a common trigger in clawback provisions. See infra notes 35, 48, 58-60 and 
accompanying text.  See also Louise Story, Wall St. Profits Were a Mirage, but Huge Bonuses Were 
Real, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at A1. United States accounting standards are, in many areas, 
subject to the exercise of judgment. In other respects, such standards are very “rules based” and, as 
such, may be manipulated in ways not contemplated by the drafters of such standards.  See 
generally Franklin A. Gevurtz, Corporate Governance and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Earnings 
Management and the Business Judgment Rule: An Essay on Corporate Scandals, 30 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1261 (2004); Matthew A. Melone, United States Accounting Standards – Rules 
or Principles? The Devil is Not in the Details, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV., 1161 (2004).  
 13. See infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 48-59 and accompanying text. 
 15. See, e.g., Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (Bailout Bill), Pub. L. No. 110-
343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008); The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 
Stat. 115 (2009). 
 16. See supra note 11. 
 17. 26 U.S.C.A. § 441(b) (West 2009). 
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The tax consequences will depend on several factors, including the 
nature of the compensation subject to clawback, the circumstances 
surrounding the clawback, and the executives’ unique tax position.18  
Part I of this article discusses and analyzes clawbacks in general, 
including clawbacks that are part of common-law remedial schemes, 
federally legislated clawbacks, and those triggered by contractual 
clawback provisions.  Part II of this article analyzes the tax 
consequences to the executives that result from the repayment or 
forfeiture of compensation.  This part provides an analysis of the annual 
accounting concept and the claim-of-right doctrine which will generally 
result in the payment and return of compensation to be accounted for in 
separate tax years and, concomitantly, will generally result in 
incongruent tax consequences.  The exceptions to the annual accounting 
concept are discussed with particular emphasis on Section 1341, an 
ameliorative provision.  The tax consequences arising from the clawback 
of compensation are heavily dependent upon the tax treatment of the 
compensation that is clawed back.  Accordingly, a detailed discussion of 
the tax treatment of cash and equity-based incentive compensation 
schemes is provided.  In many cases, the tax treatment of clawbacks is 
relatively straightforward – albeit somewhat punitive.  However, in 
certain instances, the tax consequences to executives subject to clawback 
provisions are uncertain.   
II. COMPENSATION CLAWBACKS 
A. In general 
Compensation clawbacks can be, and have been, supported by 
long-standing state law legal and equitable principles.19  Active 
participation by executives in the material misstatement of financial or 
other information presented to the board of directors or shareholders 
constitutes a breach of the duties of candor, good faith, and loyalty and 
 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 304(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7243 
(2006) (requiring the CEO and CFO of a materially noncompliant issuer to disgorge profits and 
refund to the company any bonuses earned within the last twelve months); David Blumenthal, 
Source of Funds and Risk Management for International Energy Projects, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
267, 293 (1998) (discussing clawback provisions as a way for commercial lenders to mitigate risk); 
George P. Roach, A Default Rule of Omnipotence: Implied Jurisdiction and Exaggerated Remedies 
in Equity for Federal Agencies, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1 (2007) (discussing restitution, 
disgorgement of profits, and clawback provisions). 
5
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would provide ample support for a cause of action for damages or, 
alternatively, restitution.20   
An agent’s breach of fiduciary duty is a basis on which the agent 
may be required to forfeit commissions or other compensation paid or 
payable to the agent during the period of the agent’s disloyalty.  The 
availability of forfeiture is not limited to its use as a defense to an 
agent’s claim for compensation.21 
Moreover, the equitable remedy of restitution may be sought 
regardless of whether the executive in question deliberately participated 
in the conduct that resulted in the material misstatement.  In a relatively 
recent—and prominent—case, the Delaware Chancery Court, in a 
derivative action, granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment 
that the former chief executive officer of HealthSouth Corp., Richard 
Scrushy, was unjustly enriched by the repayment of a loan with stock 
whose value was inflated by accounting irregularities that subsequently 
were disclosed to the public.22  The plaintiffs made no claim of 
 
 20. See id.  In cases where the executive had no direct hand in perpetrating the misstatement, 
but was duped by subordinates, it is likely that, absent gross negligence, the executive will be 
protected from breach-of-duty claims by the business judgment rule.  See A. Gilchrist Sparks, III & 
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law Duties of Non-Director Corporate Officers, 48 BUS. LAW. 
215 (1992). But see Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 
BUS. LAW. 439 (2005) (arguing that the business judgment rule should not protect non-director 
officers).  Professor Lyman’s distinction between officers and directors in the application of the 
business judgment rule has prompted some criticism.  See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. 
Gilchrist Sparks III, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor 
Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW. 865 (2005).  The business judgment rule provides legal cover for actions 
undertaken in good faith and made with all due care and recognizes that directors, not shareholders, 
manage the corporation.  A party challenging the board’s decision must overcome a presumption 
that “the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis in good faith and in the honest belief 
that the action was in the best interest of the company.” Orman v. Cullmann, 794 A.2d 5, 19-20 
(Del. Ch. 2002) (quoting Arenson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. Ch. 1984)).  The term 
“restitution” is often used interchangeably with the term “disgorgement.”  The former term is a 
remedy intended to make the injured party whole while the latter focuses on the wrongdoer and 
seeks to divest the recipient of the receipt of unjust benefits.  See REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 
308(C) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 19 (Securities and Exchange Commission 2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov./news/studies/SOA308creport.pdf. 
See also Andrew Kull, Rescission and Restitution, 61 BUS. LAW. 569, 574-79 (2006) (discussing 
efforts by the American Law Institute to clarify the standard for restitution).   
 21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. d(2).  For an excellent analysis of 
equitable remedies in this context, see Manning Gilbert Warren III, Equitable Clawback: An Essay 
on Restoration of Executive Compensation (May 19. 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407129.  
 22. In re HealthSouth Corp., 845 A.2d 1096 (Del Ch. 2003).  A similar result would be 
supported by a claim of innocent misrepresentation or mutual mistake of fact.  Id. at 1106-07.  In the 
case of mutual mistake of fact, the risk of loss will be allocated to the party in the better position to 
prevent or recognize the mistake.  Usually, as between a chief executive or chief financial officer 
and the company, the former should be in a better position to prevent or be cognizant of the mistake.  
6
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wrongdoing by the executive nor, in the opinion of the court, was such a 
claim necessary.  “[W]hether or not Scrushy breached a cognizable duty 
. . . he was undoubtedly unjustly enriched . . . .”23  The Alabama 
Supreme Court applied similar reasoning in requiring that Scrushy 
forfeit bonuses he received from HealthSouth.24  Contractual provisions 
that limit or preclude restitution may present obstacles to recovery, but 
such obstacles may be overcome if the contract, including its provisions 
limiting or barring restitution, is tainted by fraud or if some other 
contract law defense is available, including violations of public policy.25 
Corporations, however, are often reluctant to seek common-law 
remedies against executives and shareholders and are often stymied in 
their attempts to bring derivative actions or other private causes of 
action.26  Moreover, settlement of claims that are brought generally 
 
See, e.g., Roberts v. Century Contractors, Inc., 592 S.E.2d 215 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).  Such claims 
would not be supportable if the misstatement occurred after the contract was formed, however. 
Scrushy, acquitted of criminal charges in 2005, was recently ordered to pay $ 2.88 billion in a civil 
action.  See Valerie Bauerlein & Mike Esterl, Judge Orders Scrushy to Pay $2.88 Billion in Civil 
Suit, WALL ST. J, June 19, 2009, at B1. 
 23. Id. at 1106. 
 24. Scrushy v. Tucker, 955 So. 2d 988, 1012 (Ala. 2006).  Miller v. U.S. Foodservice, Inc., 
361 F.Supp. 2d 470, 484-85 (D. Md. 2005), in dicta, would limit restitution to cases involving the 
breach of a contractual duty). 
 25. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coughlin, 255 S.W.3d 424 (Ark. 2007)(voiding a retirement 
agreement and release of claims due to fraudulent misrepresentations).  See also Donald C. 
Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked, Homeless and Without Wheels”: Corporate 
Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate over Entity versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 627, 646-47 (2007).  In extreme cases, such as AIG, some commentators believe 
that bonuses could be recouped on unconscionability grounds or by asserting that such 
compensation payments amounted to fraudulent conveyances.  See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, 
A.I.G.’s Bonus Blackmail, N.Y. TIMES, March 18, 2009, at A27.  New York State Attorney General 
Andrew Cuomo used this rationale to compel AIG to recover bonuses and other compensation paid 
to certain executives. See David S. Hilzenrath, AIG Limits Pay of Its Top Executives, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 26, 2008, at D01.  Some members of Congress attempted another approach—punitive taxation 
of erstwhile improper bonuses.  See H.R. 1586, § 1(a), 111th Cong., 1st Sess., March 23, 2009 
(imposing a tax of 90 percent on disqualified bonus payments); Jonathan Weisman et al., Treasury 
Will Make Grab to Recoup Bonus Funds, WALL ST. J., March 18, 2009, at A1.  
 26. A decision not to seek repayment of compensation is subject to the cover provided by the 
business judgment rule.  Although the business judgment rule is inapplicable to self-interested 
decisions, the Delaware courts have extended the doctrine’s protection to executive compensation 
related matters in cases where the board of directors is comprised of a majority of independent 
directors.  See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 365 (Del. 1994).  Business 
judgment protection has been codified with respect to stock option plans.  “In the absence of actual 
fraud . . . the judgment of the directors as to consideration for the issuance of . . . options and the 
sufficiency thereof shall be conclusive.”  DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 157 (1991).  Moreover, 
extraordinarily generous compensation packages containing terms that are extremely favorable to 
executives are not subject to a “fairness” standard but instead are challengeable only if such 
packages amount to waste of corporate resources.  An act by directors that constitutes a waste of 
corporate assets is void.  Eric L. Johnson, Note, Waste Not, Want Not: An Analysis of Stock Option 
7
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result in the enterprise, or its insurance carrier, funding the settlement—
what one commentator has referred to as the “double victimization” of 
the shareholders.27  Public outrage directed at the compensation practices 
of Wall Street, perceived to be one of the root causes of the current 
economic dislocations, has put pressure on boards of directors to put in 
place mechanisms that force the disgorgement or forfeiture of 
compensation that, based on some standard of fairness, ought not be 
retained or paid.28  Legislative developments in the aftermath of the 
Enron and WorldCom scandals required clawbacks in limited 
circumstances.29  More recently, as part of the federal bailout of financial 
institutions, a new set of mandated clawbacks have been legislated.30   
 
Plans, Executive Compensation, and the Proper Standard of Waste, 26 J. CORP. L. 145, 154 (2000).  
The classical waste standard found waste to have occurred if “no person of ordinary, sound business 
judgment would deem the consideration the corporation received worth what the corporation . . . 
paid.”  Id. at 155 (quoting Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962)).  See also Lewis v. 
Vogelstein, 699 A.2d. 327 (Del. Ch. 1997).  The failure of shareholders to recoup the severance 
payments paid by Walt Disney Co. to Michael Ovitz and the failure of Fannie Mae to seek 
recoupment of incentive compensation from ex-CEO Franklin Raines after a multi-billion earnings 
restatement evidences the difficulty facing shareholders of a corporation reluctant to pursue 
executives on its own.  See Steven H. Kropp, Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation, 
Corporate Performance, and Worker Rights in Bankruptcy: Some Lessons From Game Theory, 57 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 32-35 (2007) (discussing the Michael Ovitz case); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse 
M. Fried, Executive Compensation at Fannie Mae: A Case of Perverse Incentives, Nonperformance 
Pay, and Camouflage, 30 IOWA J. CORP. L. 807, 810-11 (2005).  Shareholder challenges to 
executive compensation would come in the form of derivative litigation.  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk 
et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 751, 779 (2002).  As such, the shareholders must first, with one exception, make a demand 
on the board to investigate the claim and consider whether further action is appropriate.  Id. at 870.  
In almost all cases, the board, perhaps through a special litigation committee, will seek to have the 
action terminated.  See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive 
Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 576-77 (2001).  The exception to the demand 
requirement requires that shareholders establish that making such demand is futile by offering 
particularized facts that create reasonable doubt that the directors are independent and that the board 
is otherwise not protected by the business judgment rule—a difficult proposition.  See Bebchuk et 
al., supra, at 780-81.  Shareholder action is further inhibited by the recent developments that have 
tended to create obstacles to private causes of action.  See generally Faith Stevelman, Corporate 
Governance Five Years After Sarbanes-Oxley: Is There Real Change?, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 475, 
495-96 (2007) (describing legislation and court decisions that have had a detrimental impact on 
private securities law litigation). 
 27. Langevoort, supra note 25, at 632.  
 28. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text. 
 29. See supra note 9. 
 30. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221 (West 2009). 
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B. Federal Legislation 
1.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200231 was enacted in the aftermath of 
the brazen frauds at Enron and WorldCom.  Arguably, the most far-
reaching effects of this legislation have been felt by the accounting 
profession.32  However, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did address certain 
perceived abuses in the executive suite.  Included among its provisions 
are the imposition of trading bans during pension blackout periods, a 
requirement of timelier reporting of insider transactions, certification 
requirements for financial statements, and the grant of authority to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to seek a court order to 
temporarily freeze extraordinary payments to directors, executives, 
employees, and certain other persons.33  
Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides for the clawback 
of compensation.34  This provision, however, applies in limited 
circumstances.  Section 304 is applicable only to chief executive and 
chief financial officers of publicly traded entities, and only if the 
company is required to restate its financial results as a result of material 
noncompliance with any financial reporting requirement under the 
federal securities laws.35  Moreover, the material misstatement must 
have occurred as a result of misconduct—a term left undefined by the 
 
 31. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 et. seq. (2006). 
 32. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 101-206, 116 Stat. 746-74 (2002).  The legislation, inter 
alia, created the Public Accounting Oversight Board with significant regulatory powers over firms 
conducting audits of publicly traded corporations, prohibited independent accounting firms from 
auditing public companies if certain officers of the company were employed by the audit firm 
within the one year period preceding the audit, and instituted mandatory audit partner rotation. See 
id.  
 33. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 
2005)(en banc)(broadly defining the term “extraordinary payment”).  Pension blackout periods are 
periods in which participants in qualified plans are prohibited from trading employer securities.  
This provision was enacted as a result of the losses suffered by Enron employees by their inability 
to sell their Enron stock during the rapid decline in the value of such stock once Enron’s accounting 
came under public scrutiny.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 302, 306, 401-403, 1103, 116 
Stat. 777, 779-84, 785-89, 807 (2002).  
 34. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 at § 304. 
 35. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 304(a), 116 Stat. 778 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
7243 (2006)).  A recent federal district court decision interpreted the statute to require an actual 
restatement of earnings to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission in order to trigger 
the clawback obligation.  A mere discovery of accounting discrepancies will not suffice.  S.E.C. v. 
Shanahan, 624 F.Supp. 2d 1072, 1077-78 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 12, 2008). 
9
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statute.36  In the event that Section 304 applies, its reach is, in part, both 
narrow and broad.  It is narrow in the sense that the clawback is limited 
to compensation received in the twelve-month period following the first 
public issuance or filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
of the financial document that was ultimately restated.37  However, 
during this relatively narrow window, the reach of the clawback is fairly 
broad, encompassing any bonus, incentive-based or equity-based 
compensation, and any profits received from the sale of employer 
securities during the applicable period.38  
The statutory language requires that all such compensation be 
returned, regardless of whether a portion of such compensation would 
have been payable notwithstanding the restatement.39  The courts have 
held that there is no implied private right of action under section 304, 
 
 36. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 304(a), 116 Stat. 778 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
7243 (2006)).  The statutory language also fails to make clear whether this provision is triggered by 
the misconduct of any person or whether such misconduct must be perpetrated by the chief 
executive or chief financial officer.  Until recently, most practitioners believed that the Securities 
and Exchange Commission would bring an action against an executive under § 304 only if such 
executive had a hand in the misconduct.  However, the Securities and Exchange Commission has 
sought to impose § 304 against the former chief executive officer of CSK Auto Corp. due to the 
misconduct of several subordinate executives.  See Complaint for Violations of Section 304 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, S.E.C. v. Jenkins, No. 2:09-cv- 01510-JWS (D. Az. July 22, 2009).    
 37. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 304(a)(1)-(2), 116 Stat. 778 (2002).  Rep. Barney Frank 
of Massachusetts introduced legislation that would have expanded the coverage of § 304 to include 
the disgorgement of profits generated from the exercise of stock options by the five most highly 
compensated officers and directors if the price of the stock underlying the options declined by a 
material amount at the end of a twelve-month period following the exercise of options by any such 
officers or directors.  See Executive Stock Option Profit Recapture Act, H.R. 4208, 108th Cong., 2d 
Sess., April 22, 2004.   
 38. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 304(a)(1)-(2), 116 Stat. 778 (2002).  Note, however, that 
post-retirement payments are not included in the classes of income subject to clawback, regardless 
of whether those payments have been inflated by phantom earnings. Post-retirement arrangements 
are an effective method of camouflaging compensation.  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 26, at 
815.  The Securities and Exchange Commission has recently approved a request by the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange to modify its margin requirement to facilitate the writing of covered calls 
on employee stock options.  See Exchange Act Release No. 34-61026 (June 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/cboe/2009/34-60126.pdf.  Under the new rule, vested stock options 
could be used as collateral for covered calls written on the stock underlying the options.  Prior to 
this change, holders of stock options had to post cash collateral in order to write call options, a 
requirement that often made such a strategy prohibitively expensive.  Consequently, it is likely that 
such strategies will become more prevalent.  The language of § 304 does not appear to capture the 
income from writing such call options.  Covered call writing is a common technique to “juice” 
returns from stock holdings.  An aggressive interpretation of § 304 could include the income from 
such activities if the underlying stock has been sold.  Id. 
 39. The Securities and Exchange Commission has the authority to exempt persons from the 
application of this provision.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 304(b), 116 Stat. 778 (2002). 
10
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and its impact to date has been relatively modest. 40  However, its 
enactment did bring public awareness to the lack of willingness on the 
part of corporate boards to insist on disgorgement of bonuses and other 
incentive compensation that, in hindsight, had not been earned.41  The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act can be viewed “as an expression of social outrage at 
misconduct by some members of the elite . . . .”42  Unfortunately, it took 
almost a decade and an economic catastrophe for clawbacks to figure 
prominently in executive-compensation schemes.  
2.  Financial Bailout Legislation 
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 200843 contained 
restrictions on executive compensation applicable to financial 
institutions that sell troubled assets to the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury (Treasury), pursuant to its provisions.44  In the event that the 
Treasury purchases troubled assets directly from a financial institution 
and receives a meaningful equity or debt position in the financial 
institution the legislation prohibits both compensation arrangements with 
senior executive officers that include incentives to take unnecessary and 
excessive risks and golden parachute payments.45  A senior executive 
 
 40. See, e.g., Kogan v. Robinson, 432 F.Supp. 2d 1075 (S.D. Calif. 2006); In re Bisys Group, 
Inc. Derivative Action, 396 F.Supp. 2d 463, 464 (S.D. N.Y. 2005); Neer v. Pelino, 389 F.Supp. 2d 
648, 657 (E.D. Pa. 2005).  The board’s response to the massive restatement of earnings at Fannie 
Mae is instructive in this respect.  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 26.  See also Rachael E. 
Schwartz, The Clawback Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley: An Underutilized Incentive to Keep the 
Corporate House Clean, 64 BUS. LAW. 1, 13 (2008).  The Securities and Exchange Commission 
used its authority under § 304 to reach a settlement with William McGuire in 2007 that required 
McGuire, the former CEO of UnitedHealth Group, Inc. to return approximately $448 million of 
compensation to his former employer.  See Securities and Exchange Commission v. William W. 
McGuire, M.D., Litigation Release No. 20387 (Dec. 6, 2007). 
 41. Supra note 8. 
 42. Fanto, supra note 6, at 521. 
 43. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122  Stat. 3765 (2008).  This legislation authorizes the Secretary of 
the Treasury to establish the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to “purchase, and to make and 
fund commitments to purchase, troubled assets from any financial institution, on such terms and 
conditions as are determined by the Secretary . . . .”  Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008, § 101, 122 Stat. 3767 (2008).  The sale of troubled assets to the federal government by 
financial institutions may take place directly—the capital purchase program—or by auction.  
Participants in the direct purchase program are subject to much more stringent compensation 
limitations than those participating through auction.  In addition, the Treasury has instituted other 
programs such as the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility and programs tailored to specific 
institutions.  See infra note 45 and accompanying text.  
 44. Id. at § 111. 
 45. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, § 111(b)(1)-(2), 122 Stat. 3765, 3776-77 
(2008).  If the Treasury purchases troubled assets through auction and such purchases exceed 
$300,000,000, the legislation prohibits golden parachute arrangements with senior executive 
11
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officer is defined as one of the top five highly paid officers, whose 
compensation is required to be disclosed pursuant to the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, and non-public company counterparts.46  The 
legislation also amended I.R.C. section 162(m) to limit the tax deduction 
for compensation to covered executives to $500,000.47  In addition, this 
legislation requires that compensation arrangements for senior executive 
officers provide for the recovery of any bonuses or incentive 
compensation paid that were based on earnings, gains, or other criteria 
that are later proven to be materially inaccurate.48  Unlike Section 304 of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, this clawback requirement is intended 
to be enforced by the affected companies, does not require that the 
 
officers that apply in the event of such officer’s involuntary termination, or in connection with the 
financial institution’s bankruptcy filing, insolvency, or receivership.  Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008, § 111(c) 122 Stat. 3777 (2008).  Golden-parachute payments are defined, 
for this purpose, as compensatory payments whose present value exceeds three times the 
executive’s base amount.  The base amount is defined by reference to I.R.C. § 280G(b)(3) and the 
regulations thereunder.  See U.S. Dep’t. of the Treas. Notice 2008-TAAP (Oct. 14, 2008), available 
at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/Exec%20Comp%20TAAP%20Notice.pdf.  Moreover, the 
financial institution may not deduct executive compensation in excess of $500,000 for each 
executive nor may any golden parachute payment be deducted. In addition, a 20 percent excise tax 
is imposed on executives receiving golden-parachute payments.  See Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008, § 302, 122 Stat. 3803-06 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(5) and 26 
U.S.C. 280G(e)); I.R.S. Notice 2008-94, 2008-44 I.R.B. 1070 (Nov. 11, 2008).  The Treasury 
announced plans to develop a more stringent set of restrictions for systematically significant failing 
institutions.  See U.S. Dep’t. of the Treas. Notice 2008-PSSFI (Oct. 14, 2008), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/exec%20comp%20pssfi%20notice%20revised.pdf.  
Moreover, the Treasury announced new rules for financial institutions that receive exceptional 
assistance.  These rules apply to financial institutions that need more assistance than that available 
under the terms of the standard programs. Included among such institutions are Citigroup, Bank of 
America, and AIG.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of the Treas., Treasury Announces New 
Restrictions on Executive Compensation (Feb. 4, 2009), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg15.htm.  The government has taken an aggressive stance with 
such entities.  See Michael R. Crittenden & John D. Knoll, Treasury Toughens Its TARP Contracts, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2009, at C3.  Moreover, President Obama has appointed Kenneth R. Feinberg 
as special master for compensation.  In that role, Feinberg will oversee compensation related 
matters for the firms that have received exceptional assistance from the federal government.  See 
Louise Story & Stephen Labaton, Overseer of Big Pay is Seasoned Arbitrator, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 
2009, at B1.  Note that the tax-deduction limitations imposed by the act do not contain an exception 
for performance-based compensation and apply to non-public recipients of assistance.  See supra 
note 2 for a discussion of the general limitation on the deductibility of executive compensation.  
 46. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, § 111(b)(3), 122 Stat. 3765, 3777 (2008).   
 47. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, § 302(a), 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).  See 
supra note 2 for a discussion of the general limitation on tax deductions for executive 
compensation.  The Treasury also issued an interim final rule that requires financial institutions to 
agree, as a condition of participation in the capital purchase program, that tax deductions will be 
limited to $500,000 for compensation paid to a senior executive officer.  See Tarp Capital Purchase 
Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 62,205 (Oct. 20, 2008) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 30). 
 48. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, § 111(b)(2)(B), 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).   
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restatement be due to misconduct, applies to non-public institutions, and 
is applicable to restatements of any performance metrics.49  In contrast to 
Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the legislation does not 
require the clawback of gains realized from the sale of securities.50  
These provisions are to remain in effect for as long as the Treasury holds 
a meaningful equity or debt position in the company.51  
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 200952 amended 
the executive-compensation provisions of the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008.  The Act subjects any entity that has, or will, 
receive financial assistance under the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) to compensation standards.53  Such standards are to remain in 
 
 49. See generally The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. 
 50. See infra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 51. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, § 111(b)(1), 122 Stat. 3765, 3777 (2008). 
Section 111(b)(1) requires that “financial institutions meet appropriate standards of executive 
compensation . . . .”  This language appears to require that the financial institution itself institute the 
clawback provisions and, therefore, such clawbacks should be enforceable by the institutions 
themselves.  Id. 
 52. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
 53. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat. 
516, 517 (2009).  The Act also requires recipients of TARP assistance to form board compensation 
committees comprised entirely of independent directors.  Moreover, shareholders of assistance 
recipients are entitled to a non-binding vote on executive compensation.  Id. at 519-20 (2009).  The 
Securities and Exchange Commission has recently proposed a new Rule 14a-20 that would 
implement the statutory mandate. Under the proposed rule, publicly held TARP recipients would be 
required to provide separate shareholder votes in proxies solicited for an annual meeting of security 
holders, or special meeting in lieu of an annual meeting.  See Exchange Act Release No. 34-60218 
(July 1, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2009/34-60218.pdf.  This “say on 
pay” requirement has been a corporate governance issue for quite some time.  It is not clear how 
shareholders will respond but there are indications that they may be ready for some muscle flexing.  
See Phred Dvorak, Investors Diverge as Votes on Pay Near, WALL ST. J., April 14, 2009, at B3; 
Craig Karmin, Shareholders Renew Push to Regulate Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2009, at 
C1.  The Securities and Exchange Commission has not provided shareholders of non-TARP 
recipients with a “say on pay,” although some prominent companies, such as Verizon 
Communications and Motorola, have provided shareholders with a nonbinding vote on executive 
compensation.  See Joann S. Lublin, A Quiet Response to ‘Say on Pay’ Measures – So Far This 
Season, Shareholders are Supporting Compensation Packages, Most Board Nominees, WALL ST. J., 
May 18, 2009, at B6.  During the current proxy season, as of August 15, 2009, 68 shareholder 
proposals for an advisory vote on executive compensation have been submitted and have garnered 
45.8 percent of the votes cast.  See 2009 PROXY SEASON SCORECARD (RiskMetrics Group 2009), 
available at http://www.riskmetrics.com/knowledge/proxy_season_scorecard_2009.  The House of 
Representatives has passed a bill that would require publicly traded entities to provide shareholders 
with a nonbinding vote on executive compensation and golden parachute arrangements. See 
Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 3269, 111th Cong. § 2 
(2009). Shareholders of British firms do have the ability to cast advisory votes on compensation 
matters and have increasingly dissented on management proposals—including a remarkable 59 
percent vote against the compensation plans of Royal Dutch Shell Group.  See Muck, Brass and 
Spleen, ECONOMIST, May 21, 2009, at 70; Guy Chazan & Joann S. Lublin, Shell Investors Revolt 
13
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effect for so long as any obligation under the TARP program remains 
outstanding.54  The compensation standards under the act retain the 
prohibition on incentives that lead to unnecessary and excessive risk, 
impose the previously discussed tax deduction limitations more broadly, 
further restrict golden parachute payments, and expand the clawback 
provisions to include retention bonuses.55  Moreover, the number of 
employees whose compensation is subject to clawback is expanded to 
include, in addition to senior executive officers, the next twenty most 
highly compensated employees.56  The legislation also prohibits the 
payment or accrual of any bonus, retention award, or incentive 
compensation during the period that an obligation under the TARP 
program remains outstanding.57  An exception is made for the payment 
of restricted stock provided, however, that such stock does not fully vest 
during the period in which any obligation under the TARP program 
remains outstanding and that the value of such stock does not exceed 
one-third of the recipient’s total compensation.58  The prohibition on the 
payment of incentive compensation would seem to limit the applicability 
of clawback provisions applicable to such payments.  However, the class 
 
Over Executive Pay Plan, WALL ST. J., May 20, 2009, at B1.  The Obama administration has 
recently sought legislation that would grant shareholders a say on executive-compensation 
arrangements.  See Stephen Labaton, Treasury to Set Executives’ Pay at 7 Ailing Firms, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 11, 2009, at A1.  The Obama administration has also proposed rules that would 
strengthen the independence of board-compensation committees and regulate the practices of 
compensation consultants.  See Principles, Not Pitchforks, ECONOMIST, June 11, 2009, at 68.  
 54. The standards are not applicable if the Federal Government holds only warrants to 
purchase common stock of the TARP recipient.  American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001,123 Stat. 517 (2009).  The Auto Industry Financing and 
Restructuring Act would have imposed similar restrictions on the compensation of executives of 
automobile manufacturers.  See H.R. 7321, § 12(b) 110th Cong., 2d Sess., Dec. 10, 2008.   
 55. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat. 
517 (2009).  See also supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.  The number of employees 
restricted from receiving golden-parachute payments is expanded to include, in addition to senior 
executive officers, the next five most highly compensated employees.  Moreover, the definition of 
golden-parachute payments is modified to include any payments for departure from a company for 
any reason, except for payments for services rendered or benefits accrued.  Id.   
 56. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, § 7001, 123 Stat. 517 (2009).  
 57. Id.  This prohibition does not apply to any bonus payment required to be paid pursuant to 
a written employment contract executed on or before February 11, 2009.  American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, § 7001, 123 Stat. 518 (2009).  However, the Treasury may review pre-
enactment compensation of senior executive officers and the next twenty most highly compensated 
employees of TARP recipients and require, if such compensation is deemed inconsistent with the 
purposes of the Act or the TARP, such employees to reimburse the federal government with respect 
to such compensation.  American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 
7001, 123 Stat. 520 (2009). 
 58. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat. 
518 (2009). 
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of executives to whom the clawback provisions apply may be broader 
than the class of executives to whom the payment prohibition applies.59  
C. Contractual Clawback Provisions 
Whether, as a policy matter, legislated or administratively 
mandated curbs on executive compensation are effective is beyond the 
scope of this work.60  Public opprobrium directed at Wall Street and the 
banking industry does create the risk that political considerations will 
lead to overly restrictive compensation practices that stifle prudent risk-
taking activities.  On the other hand, the fact that clawback provisions 
had to be legislated speaks volumes about the failure of boards to 
adequately police executive compensation arrangements.  It should come 
as no surprise that the government filled the vacuum left by private 
industry.   What is certain is that the federal government’s efforts have 
created a great deal of uncertainty with respect to executive 
compensation practices and have led, and will continue to lead, to 
attempts to avoid government imposed restrictions.61  The economic 
 
 59. The provisions limiting such payments and the exception thereto apply to a number of 
employees of the TARP recipient that depends on the amount of financial assistance received.  For 
assistance less than $25,000,000 these provisions apply to the most highly compensated employee.  
For assistance between $25 million and $249,999,999 these provisions apply to the five most highly 
compensated employees.  Id. at § 111(b)(3)(C)(ii)(II). For assistance between $250 million and 
$499,999,999 these provisions apply to the senior executive officers and the 10 most highly 
compensated employees.  Id. at § 111(b)(3)(C)(ii)(III). For assistance of $500 million or more these 
provisions apply to the senior executive officers and twenty most highly compensated employees.  
Id. at § 111(b)(3)(C)(ii)(IV).    
 60. The statutory curbs have been criticized on several grounds.  The restrictions target 
incentive compensation which, according to critics, will lead to a greater reliance on base salaries 
not tied to performance.  See Eric Dash, Citigroup Has a Plan to Fatten Salaries, N.Y. TIMES, June 
24, 2009, at B1.  According to such critics, the problem was not incentive compensation per se but 
the incentive structures in place.  Other criticisms include assertions that such restrictions will lead 
to a flight of talent out of the financial sector, that the curbs are unconstitutional, and, at the other 
end of the spectrum, that they don’t go far enough.  See, e.g., Susanne Craig & Joann S. Lublin, 
Financials Post Sign of Times: CEO Wanted, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2009, at C1; David Gillen, The 
Brain Drain Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at WK1; Judith F. Samuleson & Lynn A. Stout, 
Are Executives Paid Too Much?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2009, at A13; Lucian Bebchuk, Pay Caps 
Debate: They Don’t Go Far Enough . . . , WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2009, at A11; Andrew P. Napolitano, 
. . . They Violate Good Sense and the Constitution, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2009, at A11.  According to 
data released by New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo, nine banks that received TARP 
funding paid approximately $33 billion in bonuses in 2008.  See Susanne Craig & Deborah 
Solomon, Bank Bonus Tab: $33 Billion, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2009, at A1.  Although overall 
compensation expenses at these institutions were less in 2008 than in 2007, as a percentage of 
revenues compensation expense actually increased in 2008 from the comparable figures in 2007.  
Id.   
 61. The statutory curbs on compensation are not a model of clarity and raise a number of 
implementation issues.  For example, the pay curbs imposed on a defined number of highly 
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crisis, and the federal government’s response to it, has, however, 
changed the nature of the debate with respect to executive compensation 
in the private sector.  In industries far removed from Wall Street, boards 
are approaching executive compensation in a much more adversarial 
fashion and are instituting long needed reforms, including clawback 
provisions.62 
Contractual clawback provisions are commonly used as part of non-
compete and non-disclosure agreements.63  For the most part, such 
provisions have withstood legal challenges.64  More recently, however, 
such provisions have become a more prominent feature in executive 
compensation arrangements. 65  A recent survey by The Corporate 
 
compensated employees, discussed at supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text, do not provide 
guidance as to when a company is to make the determination of which employees are covered by 
the curbs.  Moreover, the incentive pay curbs virtually assure that employees that are covered in a 
given period will not be the most highly compensated in the subsequent period.  It is not clear if the 
legislation had in mind a revolving door of persons covered.  Moreover, the Treasury is given wide 
discretion in setting terms with firms that receive extraordinary assistance.  Without some sort of 
standards private firms face a tremendous amount of uncertainty.  The Obama administration has 
appointed a Special Master of Compensation to coordinate compensation related issues.  See 
Deborah Solomon, U.S. News: White House Set to Appoint a Pay Czar, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2009, 
at A4.  Firms are also beginning to restructure compensation arrangement to provide greater 
emphasis on base salaries.  In addition, the executive compensation curbs have been a contributing 
factor that have led many firms to seek to repay TARP funds as quickly as possible.  See Aaron 
Lucchetti, Morgan Stanley Boosts Salaries As Its Bonuses Are Limited, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2009, 
at B1; Mark Maremont & Joann S. Lublin, Loopholes Sap Potency of Pay Limits, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
6, 2009, at C1; Eric Dash, 10 Large Banks Allowed to Exit U.S. Aid Program, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 
2009, at A1 (reporting that ten financial institutions have been allowed to repay $68.3 billion, more 
than a quarter of the funds received by banks since October 2008).   
 62. It is ironic, given the general perception that professional athletes are coddled and 
excessively compensated, that one enterprise that has aggressively enforced clawback provisions is 
the National Football League.  Professional football player contracts are unique in that, unlike the 
contracts of professional baseball, basketball, and hockey players, football player contracts are not 
guaranteed.  See generally Robert Forbes, Note, Call on the Field Reversed: How the NFL Players 
Association Won Big on Salary Forfeiture at the Bargaining Table, 6 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 333, 
336-37 (2007).  As a result, players commonly negotiate signing bonuses that provide substantial 
up-front money to the players.  Id. at 337. The collective bargaining agreement between the 
National Football League Players’ Association and the team owners provides for a clawback of 
signing bonuses under numerous circumstances.  Id. at 337-38. 
 63. Such provisions are subject to the challenges that are typically brought against non-
compete agreements, such as unreasonable restraint of trade issues.  With respect to the forfeiture of 
options or stock, these provisions are sometimes challenged on the grounds that such provisions 
represent an unreasonable restraint on alienation or that such provisions cannot co-exist with 
requests for injunctive relief.  See generally Richard E. Wood, Bad Boys (and Girls) Get Clawed 
Back, 18 BENEFITS L. J. 84, 90-93 (2005). 
 64. Id.   
 65. Gretchen Morgenson, Pay It Back If You Didn’t Earn It, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2008, at 
BU1 (reporting on a survey of 2,121 companies).  Although 14 percent of the sample appears 
meager, it is a substantial improvement from the less than 8 percent result from a similar study 
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Library found that 14 percent of surveyed corporations instituted some 
form of contractual clawback feature in their executive compensation 
arrangements.66  Approximately 44 percent of these provisions are 
triggered by fraud or some other form of misconduct while 
approximately 39 percent are crafted to recoup funds because of 
financial restatements.67  The Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
compensation disclosure rules require that corporations disclose their 
clawback policies in their proxy statements as part of the broader 
discussion of executive compensation policies.68  Shareholders have 
become increasingly assertive in proposing that clawback policies be 
adopted or strengthened and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
has viewed corporate attempts to keep such proposals out of the proxy 
statements with skepticism.69  
The implementation of contractual clawback provisions raises a 
host of managerial and legal issues.  On the one hand, corporations 
should design these provisions to incorporate basic notions of fairness in 
the event that performance metrics have not been met and, moreover, to 
 
conducted in 2003.  See id. (reporting that only fourteen companies had clawback provisions four 
years prior).  The survey, Paul Hodgson, 2008 Proxy Season Foresights #11, Analyst Alert (The 
Corporate Library, June 4, 2008), is available for purchase from The Corporate Library.  Another 
study by Equilar, Inc. found that 42.1 percent of the Fortune 100 companies have instituted 
clawback policies by 2006.  See CLAWBACKS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATIONS (Gibson, Dunn & 
Crutcher, LLP July 9, 2008), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/Publications/Pages/ 
ClawbacksOfExecutiveCompensation.aspx. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b)(2)(viii) (2008). 
 69. In the period between January 2004 and June 2008, thirty-two shareholder proposals 
requesting the implementation of clawback provisions were submitted.  CLAWBACKS OF 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATIONS, supra note 65.  The proposals garnered the most shareholder support 
in 2007 with almost 29 percent of votes cast supporting such proposals.  Id.  In 2008, only 10.7 
percent of votes cast supported such proposals.  Id.  With respect to shareholder proposals seeking 
to strengthen existing clawback provisions, corporations often seek to exclude such proposals from 
shareholder consideration on the basis that the company has “substantially implemented” the 
proposal.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(10) (2006).  However, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission has permitted companies to exclude such proposals only in cases where the proposal 
closely corresponds to existing clawback provisions.  See CLAWBACKS OF EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATIONS, supra note 65.  In the case of participants in the TARP program, it is likely that 
shareholder proposals to implement executive compensation policies will be subject to such 
challenges.  See Letter from Regions Financial Corp. to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Omission of Shareholder Proposal Pursuant to Rule 14a-8 (Dec. 19, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2008/columbosheetmetal121908-14a8-
incoming.pdf.  Shareholder proposals that contain clawback provisions that may be difficult to 
interpret and implement may also be challenged by the issuer on the grounds that such proposals are 
misleading because they are too vague and indefinite.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(3) (2006); 
Verizon Communications, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-Act LEXIS 299 (Feb. 21, 
2008); General Electric Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 SEC No-Act LEXIS 190 (Feb. 5, 2003).  
17
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prevent excessive risk taking and an undue focus on short-term results.  
On the other hand, corporations must consider the possibility that 
draconian clawback provisions will stifle prudent risk taking and hamper 
the corporate recruitment of new talent and the retention of existing 
talent.  Companies must decide to whom the clawback provisions will 
apply.  Limiting such provisions to those executives covered by Section 
304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 will, for most companies, prove 
under-inclusive because it is likely that many more employees will be 
entitled to performance-based compensation and will have performed 
functions that the clawback provisions are designed to regulate.70  
Provisions triggered by accounting restatements should be, in all 
fairness, implemented to apply to any employee whose compensation 
was based on erroneous figures.  
A significant issue in the drafting of clawback policies is whether 
such policies are triggered by misconduct of the employee or are of a 
“no-fault” variety.  In the event that the trigger is misconduct, the types 
of actions—or lack thereof—that constitute misconduct need to be 
expressed.71  Equitable considerations appear to favor no-fault policies 
 
 70. A number of prominent corporations have adopted clawback provisions with extremely 
limited coverage.  See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., Schedule 14A, Proxy Statement Filed Pursuant to 
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at 24 (Sep. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Microsoft 
Proxy Statement], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/789019/ 
000119312508203233/ddef14a.htm (applying clawback provisions to executive officers and the 
principal accounting officer); Qwest Communications International, Inc., Schedule 14A, Proxy 
Statement Filed Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at 36-37 (March 
18, 2009) [hereinafter Qwest Communications Proxy Statement], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1037949/000104746909002842/a2191552zdef14a.htm#du
12401_equity_compensation_plan_information (applying clawback provisions to executives).    
 71. Among the issues that should be addressed is what level of participation is required by the 
employee in the improper accounting.  For example, misconduct could be defined as direct 
participation with the intent to prepare false information, or it could be defined to include 
negligence in failing to detect inaccuracies and numerous variations in between these two standards.  
Several prominent corporations have adopted clawback policies triggered by fraud or other forms of 
misconduct.  See, e.g., Verizon Communications Inc. Schedule 14A, Proxy Statement Filed 
Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at 39 (March 23, 2009), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/732712/000119312509060836/ddef14a.htm#toc95746_ 
21; Microsoft Proxy Statement, supra note 70, at 24; General Electric Co., Schedule 14A, Proxy 
Statement Filed Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 22 (March 3, 
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40545/000119312509031738/ 
ddef14a.htm#tx96252_2.  Qwest Communications considers misconduct as one factor in the 
decision to exercise a clawback.  Qwest Communications Proxy Statement, supra note 64, at 36-37.  
The company has, however, adopted a much broader clawback policy with respect to executive 
severance payments.  Id. at 51 (subjecting severance payments to clawback due to, inter alia, acts 
involving moral turpitude, the conviction of a crime, and actions that reflect negatively on the 
company).  In contrast, Pfizer, Inc. has adopted a clawback policy that is not predicated on 
misconduct.  See Pfizer, Inc., Schedule 14A, Proxy Statement Filed Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the 
18
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when dealing with compensation measured by specific performance 
metrics that, in hindsight, due to misstatements, were not met.  However, 
such no-fault provisions will likely prove extremely unpopular with 
employees and could hamper employee recruitment and retention 
efforts.  The scope of the clawback provisions is another important 
consideration in drafting such provisions.  Section 304 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 is relatively broad in scope, encompassing both 
incentive compensation and profits from the sale of securities.72  TARP 
recipients, although not obligated to return profits from the sale of 
securities, are also subject to broad clawback provisions that include 
retention bonuses within their reach.73  An additional consideration is the 
timeframe under which such provisions operate.74  Section 304 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 provides a relatively modest twelve-month 
timeframe whereas the TARP legislation provides no such limit.75  It 
appears that clawback time frames can be comfortably extended to the 
extent that the clawback would result in the forfeiture of compensation 
accrued, but not yet paid.  For example, many companies, in light of the 
criticisms directed at bonuses based on short-term results, have instituted 
long-term holding requirements for equity awards granted to executives.  
 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at 60 (March 12, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/78003/000119312509053142/ddef14a.htm#toc58878_47.  
 72. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 does not 
apply to the profit made through the exercise of stock options.  See supra note 37 and 
accompanying text.   
 73. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.  It is extremely rare for clawback policies to 
reach qualified-pension and profit-sharing-plan income subject to the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).  This legislation contains 
anti-forfeiture provisions that would inoculate vested benefits from clawback provisions.  However, 
it is possible for such provisions to reach non-vested benefits.  See generally Clark v. Lauren Young 
Tire Center Profit Sharing Trust, 816 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1987).  However, because such plans are 
subject to strict limitations on benefits targeted at high income employees, such income is a 
relatively small portion of executive compensation.  Certain types of plans are not covered by 
ERISA’s anti-forfeiture rules.  These plans are designed to supplement the qualified plan benefits of 
top management and highly compensated employees.  A discussion of ERISA is well beyond the 
scope of this work.  For a general overview of this legislation see PAUL J. SCHNEIDER & BRIAN M. 
PINHEIRO, ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE (3d ed. 2007).  
 74. Retroactive application of clawback provisions raises a number of enforcement issues. For 
example, such provisions may violate the express terms of existing contracts and, to the extent that 
they do not, may be unenforceable due to a lack of consideration.  Of course, in cases where federal 
law provides for the clawback of compensation, such clawback will withstand any state law 
contractual claim to the contrary.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.  Companies that have instituted 
clawback provisions need to exercise care in executing severance or termination arrangements with 
employees.  Oftentimes such arrangements come with a reciprocal release of claims by the parties.  
A release of claims by the company may, if not carefully avoided, encompass any claim to 
compensation pursuant to a clawback provision.  
 75. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text. 
19
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These policies, termed “hold til (or through) retirement” requirements, 
mandate that a portion of equity awards be held until, or through, 
retirement.76  A relatively long timeframe for which such awards are 
subject to clawback should meet less employee resistance than policies 
that reach back and require repayment of compensation for which the 
recipients had unfettered use. 
Finally, careful consideration should be given to whether the board 
of directors should be given discretion in applying clawback provisions.  
Board discretion offers companies the ability to exercise such provisions 
as particular circumstances warrant.77  However, board discretion is 
likely to call into question the firm’s commitment to the instituted 
policies and perhaps raise the ire of shareholders.78  Discretionary 
clawbacks may also be subject to challenge under state wage-payment 
laws.79  Although such laws vary from state to state, incentive 
compensation often—but not always—falls outside the scope of wage-
payment laws.80  Clearly expressed contractual rights to clawback 
incentive compensation based on objective standards should also prevent 
clawbacks from running afoul of state law in states where the incentive 
compensation is subject to the statutory provisions in question.81  
 
 76. The TARP legislation institutes a variant of this type of restriction with respect to 
incentive compensation.  See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  
 77. Qwest Communications International, Inc. has incorporated significant board discretion in 
its clawback policies.  In the event of an accounting restatement that resulted in the improper 
payment to an executive then such compensation may be clawed back if  the board decides “it is in 
our best interests to recover the performance-based compensation paid to that executive . . . .”  
Qwest Communications Proxy Statement, supra note 70, at 37. 
 78. Provisions granting the board discretion are likely to generate shareholder proposals for 
tougher provisions.  It is unlikely that the Securities and Exchange Commission will grant 
management the right to exclude such proposals from a shareholder vote.  See supra note 69 and 
accompanying text.  
 79. State wage-payment laws were enacted to prevent employers from avoiding their 
obligations under, inter alia, collective bargaining agreements and minimum-wage statutes.  
California’s statute, for example, provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer to collect or 
receive from any employee any part of wages theretofore paid by said employer to said employee.”  
CAL LAB. C. § 221 (2009).   
 80. See, e.g., Int’l Bus. Machines Corp. v. Bajorek, 191 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that stock options were not wages for purposes of the California wage payment law); Int’l Paper Co. 
v. Suwyn, 978 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that incentive compensation dependent upon 
the financial results of the employer are not wages for purposes of New York’s wage-payment 
statute).  A clawback cannot cause an employee’s compensation to fall below federal or state 
minimum wage levels—an unlikely event with respect to executive compensation.  Id. at 514. 
 81. Pennsylvania law, for example, includes incentive compensation within the scope of its 
wage payment law.  See Hartman v. Baker, 766 A.2d 347 (Pa. Super. 2000).  Wage-payment laws 
do not, however, create an entitlement to compensation.  The compensation must be earned or 
vested under the terms of the contract.  Therefore, a clawback trigger that is clear and unambiguous 
will more likely withstand a claim that the compensation in question was earned or vested and thus 
20
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The enforcement of clawback provisions raises a number of federal 
income tax issues for the executives that are subject to these provisions.  
The tax consequences in the year the compensation is clawed back 
depend on various factors, including whether the compensation in 
question had been paid to the executive, the nature of the compensation 
clawed back, the executive’s particular tax circumstances, and the reason 
for the clawback.  In many respects, federal income tax law will treat 
such executives harshly – a perverse form of poetic justice.  Executives 
will often find that the forfeiture of unpaid and heretofore untaxed 
compensation is preferable than the repayment of previously taxed 
income.   
III. FEDERAL INCOME TAX IMPLICATIONS OF COMPENSATION 
CLAWBACKS 
Intuitively, the repayment or forfeiture of compensation that had 
been subject to tax in an earlier tax year should result in a tax benefit 
commensurate with the tax burden imposed on the compensation in the 
year it was taxed.  However, the annual accounting principle virtually 
assures that this is not the case.  This principle spawned the judicially 
created “claim of right” doctrine pursuant to which income that may be 
later forfeited or disgorged is nonetheless subject to tax in the year of its 
receipt.82  Correspondingly, the repayment of compensation will yield a 
deduction in the year of repayment.83  Due to the peculiarities of the 
Internal Revenue Code, it is likely that such deduction will fail to yield a 
tax benefit commensurate with the tax burden imposed upon the income.  
In the event that the taxpayer fails to recoup the taxes originally imposed 
on the compensation in question, Internal Revenue Code Section 1341 
provides relief if the taxpayer has the fortune to qualify under its 
provisions.  This part provides an analysis of the annual accounting 
principle, the claim-of-right doctrine, and Section 1341.  In addition, 
because the tax consequences of compensation clawbacks depend, in 
large part, on the taxation of the income that is clawed back, the taxation 
 
subject to the wage payment law.  See, e.g., Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 
1325 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Redick v. Kraft, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 296, 303 (E.D. Pa. 1990).  In Kafando v. 
Erie Ceramic Arts Co., 764 A.2d 59 (Pa. Super. 2000), the court held that bonuses based on the 
employer’s gross profit ratio were not wages under the Pennsylvania wage-payment statute.  Id. at 
62. The court based its holding on the fact that such earnings were not based upon an employee’s 
time or task.  Id.  It is unlikely that such a rationale would support the exclusion of incentive 
compensation for executives.   
 82. North Am. Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932). 
 83. 26 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). 
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of various forms of incentive compensation is discussed.  Finally, an 
analysis of the tax treatment of clawbacks under a myriad of 
circumstances is provided.  
A. Annual Accounting Principle 
Practical considerations dictate that taxpayers’ obligations to the 
United States Treasury be determined at some pre-defined interval.84  In 
the seminal case of Burnet v. Sanford and Brooks Co., the Supreme 
Court stated that: 
The Sixteenth Amendment was adopted to enable the government 
to raise revenue by taxation.  It is the essence of any system of taxation 
that it should produce revenue ascertainable, and payable to the 
government, at regular intervals.  Only by such a system is it practical to 
produce a regular flow of income and apply methods of accounting, 
assessment, and collection capable of practical operation.85 
U.S. income taxes are determined on the basis of an annual 
accounting period. I.R.C. section 441(a) states, “[t]axable income shall 
be computed on the basis of the taxpayer’s taxable year.”86  In most 
cases, a taxpayer’s taxable year will encompass a period of twelve 
calendar months.87  The annual accounting concept is an artifice borne 
out of administrative convenience.  Due to the all too numerous 
idiosyncrasies of the Internal Revenue Code, the segmentation of a 
taxpayer’s tax obligations into annual compartments virtually assures 
that two taxpayers with identical incomes over an extended period of 
time will incur different tax obligations.  For example, progressive tax 
rates may cause the taxpayer whose income is subject to peaks and 
valleys to bear a greater tax burden than the taxpayer earning identical 
 
 84. The annual accounting system is “a practical necessity if the federal income tax is to 
produce revenue ascertainable and payable at regular intervals.”  Hillsboro Nat’l. Bank v. Comm’r, 
460 U.S. 370, 377 (1983).  
 85. 282 U.S. 359, 365 (1931). 
 86. There are various references in the Internal Revenue Code to the taxable year.  See, e.g., 
I.R.C. §§ 11 (2006) (imposing tax on corporations for each taxable year); 6012 (2006) (requiring the 
filing of income tax returns of individuals and certain entities that exceed certain income thresholds 
during the taxable year). 
 87. See I.R.C. § 441(d)-(e) (2006).  Taxpayers may elect, under certain circumstances, a 52-
53 week taxable year that ends on the same day of week.  See I.R.C. § 441(f) (2006).  Accounting 
periods of less than twelve months may result from a change in accounting period or in cases where 
the taxpayer has not been existence for twelve months.  See I.R.C. § 443(a) (2006).  Individuals, 
with rare exceptions, determine their income on a calendar year basis.  Partnerships, S-corporations, 
and personal service corporations have limited flexibility in the selection of their taxable years.  See 
generally I.R.C. §§ 441(i); 444; 706(b); 1378 (2006).  
22
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amounts at a steadier pace.88  Likewise, a taxpayer who realizes capital 
losses in some years and capital gains in other years is likely to be 
disadvantaged when compared to a taxpayer who fortuitously realizes 
losses during the same year that gains were realized.89  The current 
economic predicament in which we find ourselves has brought to light 
the tax disadvantages of earning large amounts of income over many 
years, followed by a year or two of extraordinarily large losses—a 
situation that recent legislation has attempted to ameliorate.90   
The centrality of the annual accounting principle is evidenced by 
the federal income tax treatment of transactions that are subsequently 
rescinded. 91  Rescission may be effectuated pursuant to contract 
 
 88. Taxpayers who enjoy a few years of very high earnings may be at an advantage with 
respect to payroll taxes, specifically old-age, survivors, and disability income tax obligations.  Such 
obligations are limited to certain income thresholds that are adjusted annually for inflation.  See 
generally I.R.C. §§ 3101(a); 3121(a)(1) (2006).  
 89. I.R.C. § 1211(a) limits corporations from deducting capital losses in excess of capital 
gains, and I.R.C. § 1211(b) limits non-corporate taxpayers to deductible capital losses of $3,000 in 
excess of capital gains.  Corporate capital losses may, in general, be carried back three years and 
forward five years.  I.R.C. §§ 1212(a)(1)(A), 1212(a)(1)(B). Other taxpayers may carry forward 
unused losses indefinitely, subject to the aforementioned $3,000 limitation.  See I.R.C. § 1212(b) 
(2006).    
 90. In general, net operating losses incurred in a taxable year may be carried back two years 
and forward twenty years to offset taxable income in the year to which such losses are carried.  26 
U.S.C.A. § 172(a)-(b)(1) (West 2009).  An elective carry-back period, up to a maximum of five 
years, has been provided for certain small businesses by the recently enacted stimulus legislation.  
American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.111-5, § 1211, 123 Stat. 335 
(2009) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 172(b)(1)(I)(i)).  The value of unused net operating losses are often 
a significant asset of companies targeted by suitors.  See, e.g., Jesse Drucker & Matthew 
Karnitschnig, The Lure of Sirius: Tax Losses, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2009, at B1 (discussing the 
interest of suitors in Sirius XM Radio).  Significant limitations are imposed on the ability to 
acquiring corporations to use net operating losses generated by acquired corporations.  See 
generally I.R.C. § 382 (2006) (limiting the annual use of acquired net operating losses to the value 
of the acquired corporation multiplied by an I.R.S. provided interest rate).  The I.R.S. eased these 
rules temporarily in late 2008 for acquisitions in the financial sector.  See Notice 2008-83, 2008-42 
I.R.B. 905 (Oct. 20, 2008).  Whether the Internal Revenue Service had the authority to grant such 
relief has been subject to considerable debate.  See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Can Obama’s IRS 
Retroactively Revoke Massive Bank Giveaway?, TAX NOTES, February 16, 2009, at 889.  The 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 terminated this relief effective for ownership 
changes occurring after January 16, 2009. Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1261, 123 Stat. 342-43 (2009). 
 91. Rescission is the voiding of a contract ab initio.  Rescission is often confused with the 
abandonment of a contract.  However, abandonment of a contract discharges the injured party’s 
obligation to perform under the contract but, for purposes of supporting a remedial right to damages, 
the contract remains alive.  See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 528 (2009).  A contract may also be 
rescinded unilaterally by a party to the contract due to the existence of some legally sufficient 
grounds such as mistake, duress, fraud, and the like.  See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 549 (2009).  
Generally, a contract must be rescinded in total, but partial rescission may be allowed if the contract 
in question is divisible.  See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 533 (2009).  A party may not seek 
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provisions or may occur as a result of a court decree.92  Transactions 
may be rescinded for a number of reasons.  For example, a transaction 
that results in the issuance of corporate securities may be rescinded if the 
issuance of securities jeopardizes the tax status of the issuer.  The 
conversion of a limited liability company or partnership into a 
corporation in anticipation of an initial public offering may be unwound 
if the initial public offering is shelved.93  Rescission may also be sought 
as a remedy in an adversarial proceeding.  In Penn v. Robertson,94 
executives of the American Tobacco Company participated in a stock 
purchase program under which the participants were able to purchase 
stock in the company at prices below the stock’s fair market value.  The 
employees issued notes in payment for the stock, and the program 
anticipated that the notes would be repaid from dividends and bonuses 
the participants were to receive from the company.95  In the year 
subsequent to the institution of the program, the entire arrangement was 
rescinded in response to shareholder lawsuits alleging that the plan was 
not duly authorized.96  The Fourth Circuit held that the income received 
by the executives under the program in the year prior to rescission was 
properly reported in that year.97  The income received in the year of 
rescission and paid back to the company was not reportable as income, 
however.98  
The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that transactions will be 
disregarded for tax purposes if the transaction is rescinded during the 
same taxable year and the parties are returned to the status quo ante.99  
 
rescission and damages for breach although such remedies may be alternatively pleaded.  See 
generally 25 AM. JUR. 2D Election of Remedies § 25 (2009). 
 92. Id. 
 93. The issuance of certain types of securities may cause the termination of a corporation’s 
election to be taxed as an S-corporation.  See I.R.C. § 1361(b) (2006).  Publicly traded partnerships, 
with certain exceptions, are taxed as corporations.  Absent an election to be taxed as a corporation, 
limited liability companies are taxed as partnerships.  Consequently, from a tax standpoint, there is 
little to be gained by retaining the partnership or limited liability company form if the entity’s 
ownership interests are publicly traded.  See generally I.R.C. § 7704 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 
301.7701-3(b)(i) (2006).  See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-13-027 (March 31, 2006); I.R.S. Priv. 
Ltr. Rul. 2005-33-002 (Aug. 19, 2005). 
 94. 115 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1940). 
 95. Id. at 170. 
 96. Id. at 171. 
 97. Id. at 174-75. 
 98. Id. at 175-76. 
 99. Rev. Rul. 80-58, 1980-1 C.B. 181.  Section 1(b)(2)(C) of H.R. 1586, discussed supra note 
25, created a legislative version of the rescission doctrine.  The 90 percent tax imposed on 
disqualified bonus payments would not have applied to bonus payments that were returned by the 
employee before the close of the taxable year.  Id. 
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Consequently, transactions rescinded in a later year will not disturb the 
tax consequences reported in tax years prior to the rescission.100  The 
rescission doctrine has limited applicability to compensation clawbacks.  
Typically, clawbacks do not arise from the rescission of a contract.  To 
the contrary, clawbacks may be triggered under the terms of the contract.  
Penn v. Robertson may provide support for the position that 
compensation that is returned in the same year that it was received need 
not be reported as income.101  However, it is unlikely such situations will 
arise with regularity.    
In addition to the tax disparities that result from the timing of 
income that is earned over an extended period, the annual accounting 
concept can also create anomalies on a transactional basis.  Quite often, 
the profitability of routine transactions cannot be determined with 
certainty during a taxable year.102  For example, the ultimate profitability 
of a sales transaction will not be known until the receivable generated by 
the sale is collected or the warranty period applicable to the item sold 
has expired.103  Cash-method taxpayers must recognize prepaid income 
at the time of its receipt despite the fact that the taxpayer is obligated to 
render services in a subsequent taxable year.104  In certain cases, the 
statutes or regulations attempt to approximate the results that would be 
attained in a transactional accounting system.105  In extremely rare 
 
 100. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-41-010 (Oct. 15, 1993).  
 101. See Penn v. Robertson, 115 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1940). 
 102. See infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 103. Certain accrual-basis taxpayers doing business in the fields of health, law, engineering, 
architecture, accounting, actuarial science, performing arts, or consulting do not need to accrue 
income that, on the basis of past experience, will not be collected.  I.R.C. § 448(d)(3) (2006).  Banks 
and certain other financial institutions are permitted to reserve for loan losses.  See I.R.C. §§ 585; 
593 (2006).  
 104. Accrual-basis taxpayers may also be required to report prepaid income in the year of 
receipt.  However, several exceptions are available to accrual-basis taxpayers that prevent this 
result.  See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5 (2001) (providing an exception for advance payments 
for goods); Rev. Proc. 2004-34, 2004-22 I.R.B. 991 (June 1, 2004) (modifying and superseding 
Rev. Proc. 71-21, 1971-2 C.B. 549 to expand the scope of transactions for which taxpayers may 
defer income from advance payments for services). 
 105. For example, regulations that implement the installment sales rules of I.R.C. § 453A 
contain detailed provisions that govern the accounting of installment sales with contingent sales 
prices.  These regulations require the taxpayer’s basis in the property sold to be recovered under 
various methods depending on whether a maximum sales price is stated, a fixed period of time is 
stated, or whether neither a maximum price nor fixed period time is provided.  In a similar vein, an 
elaborate set of rules has been promulgated to deal with debt instruments with contingent interest 
under the original issue discount rules.  See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.453A-1(c) (1994); 1.1275-4 
(2004).  Taxpayers accounting for long-term contracts under the percentage of completion method 
may be required to pay interest if, after the contract is completed and all costs are known, the 
taxpayer’s estimates of the percentage of the contract completed throughout the years was too low, 
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circumstances, a taxpayer may keep a transaction open until it is 
completed.106   
B. Claim of Right Doctrine 
1.  Income Inclusion 
The need to keep faith with the annual accounting concept led to 
the judicially created claim-of-right of doctrine.  This doctrine requires a 
taxpayer to recognize income received under a claim of right despite the 
fact that taxpayer may be obligated to return such income in the 
future.107  This doctrine is founded on the premise that income must be 
 
thereby resulting in a deferral of tax.  See generally I.R.C. § 460(b)(2) (2006).  The aforementioned 
rules are not meant to be exhaustive, but merely indicative of the Internal Revenue Service’s 
willingness to engage in transactional accounting when it believes the annual accounting system 
provides taxpayers with an easy avenue to tax deferral.  On occasion, however, transactional type 
accounting does benefit taxpayers.  See supra note 103 (noting that certain accrual basis taxpayers 
do not have to accrue income for services that, based on experience, will go uncollected). 
 106. The open-transaction doctrine causes the tax consequences of a transaction to remain open 
until subsequent events materialize that allow for the determination of the income generated from 
the transaction.  This doctrine has its most singular applicability in the context of contingent sales 
transactions.  The open-transaction doctrine had its genesis in the landmark case of Burnet v. Logan, 
283 U.S. 404 (1931).  In general, income from an open transaction will not be recognized until such 
time as the proceeds received exceed the taxpayer’s basis in the property.  The Internal Revenue 
Service strongly resists the application of this doctrine and, over the years, has substantially 
diminished its availability.  For example, in the case of an installment sale with a contingent sales 
price, the lack of a maximum sales price or fixed period of time under which payments are to be 
received raises factual questions as to whether a sale has, in fact, occurred.  If, after considering all 
the facts and circumstances, a sale has indeed occurred, then the taxpayer will recover her tax basis 
over a fifteen-year period.  See Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(c)(4) (1994).  In the event that the sale is 
not subject to installment reporting, the Internal Revenue Service has made clear that open-
transaction treatment is reserved for “those rare and extraordinary cases in which the fair market 
value of the obligation cannot reasonably be ascertained.”  Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(d)(2)(iii) 
(1994).  One commentator believes that the open transaction doctrine spawned the Arrowsmith 
doctrine that is discussed at infra notes 153-164 and accompanying text.  See Myron C. Grauer, The 
Supreme Court’s Approach to Annual and Transactional Accounting for Income Taxes: A Common 
Law Malfunction in a Statutory System?, 21 GA. L. REV. 329, 357-58 (1986).  Ironically, the current 
tax treatment of nonqualified stock options bears a strong resemblance to the open transaction 
doctrine.  In essence, the incidence of taxation is postponed from the date the options are granted 
until the date such options are exercised.  There is no principled reason why such options cannot be 
valued at the date of grant.  See generally Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options 
and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973) (presenting the Black-Scholes model); JOHN 
C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES, 194-207 (4th ed. 2000) (discussing the 
binomial option pricing model).  See also infra note 251 (citing to the recently issued accounting 
standard that mandates the expensing of compensatory options at the time of grant).  For a 
discussion of the tax treatment of compensatory stock options see infra notes 252-254 and 
accompanying text.  
 107. See infra note 109. 
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determined at the close of a taxable year and that subsequent events are 
disregarded.108  The claim-of-right doctrine was established in the 
seminal case of North American Oil Consolidated Co. v. Burnet.109  In 
that case, the taxpayer and the United States were embroiled in a dispute 
regarding beneficial ownership and income from an oil field that the 
taxpayer operated, but in which the government held legal title.110  A 
receiver was appointed in 1916 to operate the property and hold the 
income derived there from.111  A district court, in 1917, held in favor of 
the taxpayer and the receiver thereby turned over the income to the 
taxpayer in that year.112  The government appealed and the district 
court’s decision was affirmed in 1920.113  Certiorari was denied in 1922.  
The taxpayer asserted that the income received in 1917 was taxable in 
1922, the year all litigation over the income terminated.114  The Internal 
Revenue Service argued that the income was taxable in 1917, the year 
the taxpayer received the income.115  The Supreme Court, holding for the 
government, stated that: 
[I]f a taxpayer received income under a claim of right and without 
restriction as to its disposition, he has received income which he is 
required to return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not 
 
 108. The irrelevance of subsequent events is premised on both doctrinal and practical 
considerations.  Doctrinally, the fact that the taxpayer has actual command over the property taxed 
provides justification for taxation at that time.  United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 591 (1951).  In 
addition, disregard of subsequent events avoids the administration burdens that would be imposed 
upon the Internal Revenue Service if it had to determine the merits of taxpayers’ claims.  See United 
States v. Merrill, 211 F.2d 297, 304 (9th Cir. 1954). 
 109. 286 U.S. 417 (1932).  The Court held that the claim-of-right doctrine applied regardless of 
whether the taxpayer utilized the cash or accrual method of accounting.  Id. at 423.  The only 
discernable difference in the application of the claim-of-right doctrine to cash- and accrual-basis 
taxpayers appears to be the timing of the deduction in the event the income is required to be repaid.  
Accrual-basis taxpayers are entitled to deduct the repaid income in the year it is properly accruable 
under general tax accounting principles.  The term “claim of right” was actually coined in an earlier 
Sixth Circuit case.  See Board v. Comm’r, 51 F.2d 73, 75 (6th Cir. 1931).  
 110. N. Am. Oil Consol., 286 U.S. at 420. 
 111. Id. at 421. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 420 (1932). 
 115. All references to the Internal Revenue Service include references to the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue, the former name of the agency.  The official name of the agency was changed to the 
Internal Revenue Service in 1953.  See T.D. 6038, 1953-2 C.B. 443.  The taxpayer argued that the 
income was taxable either in 1916, the year the income was earned but retained by the receiver, or 
in 1922, the year all litigation terminated.  N. Am. Oil Consol., 286 U.S. at 422. The Court held that 
the income was not taxable in 1916 because the taxpayer had not received the income in that year.  
Id. at 423.  It appears that the taxpayer was willing to incur tax on the income in 1916 because tax 
rates were lower in 1916 than they were in 1917.  See Grauer, supra note 106, at 351 n.65 (citing M. 
CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION ¶10.02, at 205). 
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entitled to retain the money, and even though he may still be adjudged 
liable to restore its equivalent.116 
In dicta, the Court stated that had the taxpayer been obliged to 
return the income, it would have been entitled to a deduction in the year 
the profits were returned and would not be entitled to amend a previous 
year’s return.117  The Court had occasion to revisit this issue in United 
States v. Lewis.118  In this case the taxpayer received a bonus in 1944.119  
Two years later, the taxpayer, as a result of litigation, was required to 
repay approximately one-half of the bonus to his employer.120  The 
taxpayer sought a refund of taxes that he paid in 1944 but the Internal 
Revenue Service contended that the repayment of the bonus was 
deductible as a loss in 1946, the year it was repaid.121  The Court, citing 
North American Oil, held for the government.122  Interestingly, the Court 
had the opportunity to create an exception to the claim-of-right doctrine 
for cases in which the statute of limitations for amending returns had not 
run.  In this case, the taxpayer had the ability to file an amended return.  
The Court chose not to create such an exception.123  The Supreme Court 
and lower courts have reaffirmed the claim-of-right doctrine on several 
occasions and it “has become a firmly established principle of federal 
income taxation.”124  
 
 116. N. Am. Oil Consol., 286 U.S. at 424.  This doctrine requires that amounts be received 
under a claim of right.  The taxpayer must treat the income as hers.  Therefore, the doctrine does not 
apply to customer or client overpayments that are reflected as liabilities on the books of the 
taxpayer.  The doctrine does apply, however, to funds received by mistake, embezzlement, violation 
of fiduciary duties, and breach of contract.  See JAMES E. MAULE, GROSS INCOME: TAX BENEFIT, 
CLAIM OF RIGHT AND ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME, 502-3rd TAX MGMT. (BNA 2007) A-26 - A-29.  
The doctrine has not been applied to prepaid income.  Id. at A-25.  The taxation of prepaid income 
is guided by general tax accounting principles and specific guidance has been issued by the Internal 
Revenue Service with respect to such income.  See supra note 104 and accompanying text.   
 117. N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932). 
 118. 340 U.S. 590 (1951). 
 119. Id. at 590. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 591. 
 122. Id. at 591-92.  
 123. Justice Douglas would have created such an exception.  United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 
590, 592 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 124. MAULE, supra note 116, at A-23.  More than three-quarters of a century after its arrival, 
the precise contours of this doctrine are not entirely clear. Commentators disagree whether the 
doctrine is a tax accounting concept, created solely for the purpose of determining when income is 
subject to tax, or a substantive rule of law that defines taxable income. The Supreme Court declined 
to opine on this issue.  See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 216 n.7 (1961).  Moreover, the 
requirement that income be received under “claim of right” has been ignored in the case of ill-gotten 
income.  It is well-settled that funds obtained through embezzlement or theft are taxable under this 
doctrine in the year of receipt, despite the fact that the wrongdoer has no cognizable claim to the 
funds.  See, e.g., id. at 219; Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 137 (1952).  The Bernard Madoff 
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The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Merrill,125created a limited 
exception to the application of the claim-of-right doctrine.  In that case, a 
cash-method taxpayer erroneously received executor fees, discovered the 
mistake in the year such fees were received, and acknowledged his 
obligation to repay the fees.126  However, the fees were repaid in a later 
year.127  The court held that the erroneous fees were not income in the 
year of receipt and noted that the “harsh claim of right doctrine” should 
not apply to taxpayers who, acting in good faith, acknowledge their 
obligation to repay amounts in the year such amounts are received.128  
The courts have generally limited the Merrill exception to situations 
where the obligation to repay is unconditional, and the funds in question 
were obtained by virtue of a mistake, as opposed to wrongdoing.129  The 
Seventh Circuit has refused to apply the Merrill exception on the 
grounds that Merrill predated the enactment of Section 1341, a provision 
 
scandal raises some interesting issues with respect to application of this doctrine.  Taxpayers who 
actually received funds from Madoff that are required to be returned arguably will be ensnared by 
the doctrine and will have to settle for deducting any repayments made in the year of repayment.  
Investors who did not actually receive the phantom income that Madoff claimed to have generated 
may be able to file amended returns for the years in which the statute of limitations has not run.  
However, if the income that was reported to investors was subject to withdrawal by the investors 
then, quite possibly, they were in constructive receipt of the income and the claim-of-right doctrine 
may very well apply. Until more facts come to light regarding Madoff’s Ponzi scheme it is difficult 
to draw conclusions as to the possible tax consequences for defrauded investors.  The I.R.S. has 
issued very favorable guidance with respect to the tax treatment of these losses.  The I.R.S. has 
ruled that losses incurred by investors are to be treated as theft losses related to a transaction entered 
into for profit.  Consequently, the loss is not subject to the 10 percent of adjusted gross income 
reduction nor the per occurrence floor applicable to casualty and theft losses. Moreover, such losses 
are not subject to the 2 percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions nor to the I.R.C. § 68 
overall limitation on such deductions.  Rev. Rul. 2009-9, 2009-14 I.R.B. 735 (March 17, 2009).  
The I.R.S. has also provided safe harbors for determining the amount of the deduction.  The safe 
harbor applies only to investors who invested directly in the Ponzi scheme and not to those investors 
who invested in the scheme indirectly—for example, through a fund of funds investment.  Investors 
not pursuing a recovery of funds from a third party may deduct 95 percent of their losses less any 
recoveries from insurance providers or the Securities Investor Protection Corporation.  Investors 
pursuing claims against third parties may deduct 75 percent of their losses.  Rev. Proc. 2009-20, 
2009-14 I.R.B. 749 (March 17, 2009).  For an excellent analysis of the inconsistencies in the 
application of the claim-of-right doctrine  - and the exceptions thereto—see Harold Dubroff, The 
Claim-of-right doctrine, 40 TAX L. REV. 729, 738-47 (1985).  
 125. 211 F. 2d 297 (9th Cir. 1954).  
 126. Id. at 298-99. 
 127. Id. at 302. 
 128. Id. at 304.  
 129. See Hope v. Comm’r, 471 F.2d 738, 742 (3d Cir. 1973); Buff v. Comm’r, 496 F. 2d 847, 
848 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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intended to ameliorate the inequities that may result from the application 
of the claim of right doctrine.130  
The claim-of-right doctrine will prevent taxpayers whose income is 
clawed back from amending prior years’ income tax returns.  Any tax 
benefits that result from the repayment or forfeiture of compensation 
will be limited to those generated by a tax deduction in the year such 
compensation is repaid or forfeited.  
2.  Deductibility of Repayments  
a.  In General 
The corollary to the recognition of income received under a claim 
of right is the deduction of the repayment of such income in a 
subsequent tax year.  Subject to various exceptions, the tax code limits 
deductions to expenditures or losses incurred in a trade or business or in 
connection with an activity entered into for profit.  Section 162(a) states 
that “[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and 
necessary expenses paid or incurred in carrying on any trade or business 
. . . .”131  In the case of individuals, losses are also deductible if such 
losses are incurred in a trade or business.132  The distinction between an 
expense and a loss is not entirely clear, but whether a compensation 
repayment is classified as an expense or a loss should be of little 
practical consequence.133  Whether a taxpayer is engaged in the carrying 
 
 130. Quinn v. Comm’r, 524 F. 2d 617, 625 (7th Cir. 1975).  Section 1341 was enacted in 1954.  
For a detailed analysis of this provision see infra notes 174-196 and accompanying text.  The 
Seventh Circuit’s rationale appears harsh.  Not all amounts received by cash basis taxpayers are 
income—cash advances under a credit card arrangement, for example.  Likewise, if an individual 
mistakenly receives a payment that is clearly meant for another person and that fact is known to the 
recipient upon receipt then no income is realized.  The fact that the recipient discovers the mistake 
in the same tax year, but not immediately upon receipt, hardly seems to justify treating the receipt of 
such funds as income.  The rescission doctrine, discussed at supra notes 91-100 and accompanying 
text, requires the transaction and its rescission to occur in the same tax year.  However, the 
circumstances to which Merrill putatively applies do not involve the unwinding of a contractual 
arrangement or legal status under which the recipient originally obtained the funds in question.  Id. 
 131. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006).  
 132. I.R.C. § 165(c)(1) (2006).  A variety of expenses and losses are deductible that do not 
arise in a trade or a business or in activities carried on for profit.  For example, interest expense on 
debt secured by a mortgage on a personal residence, state and local realty or income taxes, casualty 
and theft losses, charitable contributions, medical expenses, and alimony are deductible.  See, e.g., 
I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(2)(D); 164(a)(1)-(2); 165(c)(3); 170; 213; 215 (2006).   
 133. Most tax practitioners would classify expenditures made without a concomitant benefit or 
the disposition of property for less than its tax basis as losses.  One court described the distinction 
between losses and expenses as “self-evident.”  Holt v. Comm’r, 69 T.C.75, 78 (1977).  However, it 
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on of a trade or business is a factual question.  Trade or business status 
requires the existence of a profit motive and the engagement of regular 
and considerable levels of activity with respect to the enterprise.134  The 
rendering of services as an employee is considered the carrying on of a 
trade or business.135  Whether an expense is ordinary depends on the 
facts and circumstances and not whether an expense is recurrent in 
nature.136  
An expenditure is deemed necessary if such expenditure is 
appropriate and helpful.137  Thus, although an expenditure that is 
essential to the business would easily pass muster under this standard, 
deductibility does not turn on whether an expenditure is deemed 
essential.138  It is not necessary for the expenditure to have been 
compelled, either contractually or otherwise, but voluntary expenditures 
have met with mixed results.139  With respect to compensation 
repayments, whether such repayments are considered necessary appear 
to turn, in large part, on whether the repayments were compelled, by law 
 
is often difficult to make a principled distinction between expenses and losses.  See Fed’n Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 27 T.C. 960 (1975) (holding that a bank’s payments to settle depositor claims 
were deductible as either expenses or losses).  
 134. See Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987).  The issue of whether the taxpayer 
has a profit motive may be a significant issue for individual taxpayers.  If the activity is found to 
lack a profit motive then deductions attributable to such an activity are limited to the gross income 
derived from the activity.  These so-called hobby loss rules contain a presumption that an activity is 
engaged in for profit if the activity generates net income for a certain number of years in a defined 
testing period.  See generally I.R.C. § 183 (2006).                   .  
 135. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-17(a) (1990).  A significant number of disputes arise over the status 
of investment activities.  The Supreme Court, in Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 217-218, 
reh’g. denied, 312 U.S. 714 (1941), held that the taxpayer’s activities in managing a large securities 
portfolio did not rise to the level of a trade or business.  The assets in question were financial assets 
that entitled the taxpayer to income but gave him neither the right to participate in managing the 
operations of a business nor any liability exposure beyond his investment.  Id. at 215.  Under 
Higgens, direct ownership of property, with its concomitant right to management and exposure to 
liability, is required for trade or business status.  For example, real estate holdings may or may not 
represent a trade or business.  Speculative holdings in raw land for eventual sale, rental real estate 
subject to long-term net leases, and royalty interests in natural resources, probably would not rise to 
the level of a trade or business.  See Pinchot v. Comm’r., 113 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1940); Rev. Rul. 73-
522, 1973-2 C.B. 226 (1973). 
 136. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).  Generally speaking, if, under the 
circumstances, an expense would typically be incurred, it would be considered ordinary despite the 
fact that the circumstances surrounding the expenditure would not be expected to occur with 
regularity—law suits, for example.  
 137. See id. at 113. 
 138. See infra note 139. 
 139. Compare Levy v. Comm’r, 30 T.C. 1315 (1958) (holding that voluntary payments made 
by an agent to a performer were deductible) with Friedman v. Delaney, 171 F.2d 269 (1st Cir. 1948) 
(denying a deduction for voluntary payments made by an attorney to his clients to mitigate losses 
incurred partly as a result of the attorney’s advice).  
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or agreement, or were voluntary.140  In closely-held corporations, 
compensation repayments by shareholder-employees are not that 
unusual and are typically triggered by the Internal Revenue Service’s 
assertion that the compensation in question was unreasonable and, 
therefore, not deductible.141  In such circumstances, the employee is also 
a shareholder and the compensation may be repaid despite the fact that a 
clawback provision is absent from the employment contract and the 
corporate by-laws.142  Voluntary repayments of this sort have also not 
fared well under Section 1341, discussed subsequently.143  
If the expenditure or loss is incurred in connection with an activity 
that does not rise to the level of a trade or business, then an expense or 
loss deduction is nonetheless available if the expenditure was incurred 
for the production or collection of income or if the loss was incurred in 
an activity engaged in for profit.144  Otherwise, no deduction is available 
unless the expense or loss falls within another statutory provision.145  
The deductibility of amounts repaid may be denied if the amount 
originally received under a claim of right was not subject to tax.  In 
general, this issue arises in cases where the amounts repaid were tax 
 
 140. See generally United States v. Simon, 281 F.2d 520, 526 (6th Cir. 1960); Blanton v, 
Comm’r, 46 T.C. 527 (1966), aff’d. per curiam 379 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1967); Rev. Rul. 69-115, 
1969-1 C.B. 50.  
 141. Compensation is deductible to the extent it is reasonable.  In closely held corporations 
high-ranking officers are typically shareholders.  Excessive compensation may be re-characterized 
as a dividend for which no deduction is available to the corporation.  See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-
7(1958); 1.162-8 (1958).  Consequently, the corporate by-laws or the terms of an employment 
agreement may require compensation, found by the Internal Revenue Service to be excessive, to be 
repaid.  Similar requirements are also found with respect to compensation that may be classified as a 
golden parachute.  Golden-parachute payments are payments made to officers, shareholders, or 
highly compensated employees made as a result of a change in control of the corporation and that 
exceed certain thresholds.  Such payments are not deductible.  See generally I.R.C. § 280G (2006).   
 142. Arguably, a voluntary repayment by employees in a publicly traded corporation made to 
retain employment would have a much better chance of meeting the “necessary” requirement than 
repayments made by employees who were also controlling shareholders of the employer.  Several 
Nortel executives voluntarily repaid compensation after prior year earnings of the company were 
restated.  See Anne Newman, Giving Back the Bonus, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 24, 2005, at 44.  
 143. See infra notes 174-196 and accompanying text.  
 144. See I.R.C. §§ 212(1); 165(c)(2) (2006).  Section 212, like § 162, contains the “ordinary 
and necessary” requirement for deductible expenses.  See supra note 131 and accompanying text.  If 
the activity is found to lack a profit motive, then deductions attributable to the activity are limited to 
the gross income derived from the activity.  These so-called hobby loss rules contain a presumption 
that an activity is engaged in for profit if the activity generates net income for a certain number of 
years in a defined testing period.  See generally I.R.C. § 183 (2006).  
 145. Numerous deductions are allowed without regard to whether the expenditures or losses are 
incurred in a trade or business or in profit-making activity.  Among the more common such items 
are mortgage interest, real estate and income taxes, casualty and theft losses, charitable 
contributions, and medical expenses.  See generally I.R.C. §§ 163; 164; 165; 170; 213 (2006).   
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exempt, such as gifts146 or the proceeds of a life insurance policy,147 or in 
cases where the funds received were not reported as income—a not 
infrequent occurrence with respect to income from illegal activities.  
Various justifications for the denial of deductions for repayments of such 
amounts have been put forth, including consistency, equity, lack of tax 
basis, and tax-benefit analysis.148  It is doubtful that this issue will 
regularly arise with respect to the repayment of compensation.149  As 
subsequently discussed, forfeited compensation that was not previously 
includable in income typically will not implicate claim-of-right issues.150  
In such cases, the forfeited income was not realized and, therefore, was 
not income at all.  Consequently, the forfeiture of such income is not a 
taxable event.   
A related issue—the character of the deduction—is likely to arise 
with some regularity.  It is quite possible that clawback provisions 
encompass any gains generated by the sale or exchange of employer 
securities that were taxed at favorable capital-gain rates.151  Deductions 
attributable to the repayment of such gains will be treated as capital 
losses, subject to the limitations applicable to such losses.152  The 
 
 146. See I.R.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 147. See I.R.C. § 101(a)(1) (2006). 
 148. See Buras v. Comm’r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1311 (1977); Shipley v. United States, 608 F.2d 
770, 773 (9th Cir. 1979).  Lack of basis is generally used to support the denial of losses, under 
I.R.C. § 165, whereas the other justifications tend to support the denial of deductions under I.R.C. 
§§ 162 and 212.  The Supreme Court limited, on equitable grounds, a taxpayer’s deduction 
attributable to refunds of customer overcharges because the overcharges generated a related 
depletion deduction that was determined as a percentage of gross receipts.  United States v. Skelly 
Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 680 (1969). Skelly Oil should be limited to situations in which the income 
item in question triggers a specific deduction and should not apply broadly to cases where the 
income items generated no additional tax because the taxpayer was in an overall loss position.  See, 
e.g., O’Meara v. Comm’r, 8 T.C. 622, 633-35 (1947).  For an excellent analysis of Skelly see Joel 
Rabinovitz, Effects of Prior Year’s Transactions on Federal Income Tax Consequences of Current 
Receipts or Payments, 28 TAX L. REV. 85 (1972). 
 149. If property is forfeited, then the deductible loss would be limited to the tax basis of the 
property to the employee at the time of forfeiture.  For example, if employer stock is required to be 
returned to the employer, then the employer’s loss is limited to the basis of the stock and not the fair 
market value of the stock at the time of forfeiture.  Arguably, this limitation arises from the 
application of I.R.C. § 1001, which provides that gain or loss on the sale or other disposition of 
property is determined by reference to the amount realized on such sale or disposition and the 
taxpayer’s basis in the property sold or disposed,  and not from the application of judicially 
developed equitable doctrines.  See infra notes 235-259 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the tax treatment of compensation paid in the form of property. 
 150. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.  
 151. Such gains are within the scope of § 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  See supra 
note 38 and accompanying text.   
 152. See infra notes 153-168 and accompanying text. 
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seminal case that mandates such a result is Arrowsmith v. 
Commissioner.153   
At issue in Arrowsmith was the characterization of payments made 
by the former shareholders of a corporation, since liquidated, to satisfy a 
judgment against the corporation.154  Several years earlier, the 
shareholders had received liquidating distributions that were taxed at 
favorable capital gain rates.155  Had the corporation satisfied the 
judgment prior to its liquidation, the shareholders would have received 
less in liquidation and, therefore, reported a smaller capital gain.156  The 
shareholders treated the payments in the later year as an ordinary loss 
because the payments did not result from a sale or exchange, a 
requirement for capital gain or loss treatment.157  The Third Circuit had 
recently accepted this argument in a similar case.158  The Second Circuit 
held, however, that the annual accounting principle did not preclude the 
examination of the treatment of the transaction in prior years for 
purposes of characterizing the current year’s transaction.159  Because the 
payment of the judgment was integrally related to the prior liquidation 
transaction, the character of the income from the original transaction 
should govern the character of the later deduction.  The Supreme Court 
affirmed the Second Circuit and noted that the decision did no violence 
to the annual accounting principle because it did not require the 
reopening of prior tax years.160  
The scope of the Arrowsmith doctrine has been the subject of 
debate.161  The Court in Skelley Oil, discussed above, cited to 
Arrowsmith in support of its holding limiting a deduction because the 
income to which it related was not fully subject to tax.162  Arrowsmith, 
however, was strictly a characterization issue and did not concern itself 
with the amount of the item in question—a point noted by Justice 
Stewart in dissent.163  Despite the uncertainty about whether Arrowsmith 
 
 153. 344 U.S. 6 (1952). 
 154. Id. at 7-8. 
 155. Id. at 7. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Capital gain or loss treatment results from the sale or exchange of a capital asset.  See 
I.R.C. § 1222 (2006).          
 158. See Comm’r v. Switlik, 184 F.2d 299, 302 (3d Cir. 1950).  
 159. 193 F.2d 734, 735 (2d Cir. 1951). 
 160. Arrowsmith v. Comm’r, 344 U.S. 6, 8-9 (1952).  
 161. See infra note 163 and accompanying text; Rabinovitz, supra note 148, at 87-88. 
 162. United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 685 (1969).  
 163. Id. at 697-98 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  The taxpayers had paid tax on their previously 
reported capital gains in full, but at a favorable rate.  Id. at 698 n.6.  Therefore, unlike Skelly Oil, the 
income was subject to tax in full.  The Court in Skelly Oil did make note of this fact, and admitted 
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should be extended to cases where the amount of the deduction is in 
question, its application in characterizing a deduction is not in dispute.164   
Finally, regardless of the level of employee culpability, the 
deductibility of compensation repayments pursuant to a clawback 
agreement should be circumvented neither by the application of I.R.C. 
section 162(f) nor by resort to some public policy rationale.165  Section 
162(f) disallows a deduction for any fine or similar penalty paid “to a 
government for the violation of any law.”166  Therefore, amounts paid 
pursuant to a clawback provision that are remitted to the employer are 
outside the scope of section 162(f).  Moreover, the legislative history of 
this provision indicates that its passage was intended, in part, to restrain 
the courts from determining that certain deductions should be denied on 
public policy grounds.167  
 
that a better analogy would have been drawn had the taxpayers elected, as they were permitted to do 
under existing law, to exclude fifty percent of the capital gains and forego the favorable capital gain 
tax rate.  Id. at 685 n.4.  Moreover, the Court went on to state that Arrowsmith stood for the 
proposition that “if money was taxed at a special lower rate when received, the taxpayer would be 
accorded an unfair tax windfall if repayments were generally deductible from receipts taxable at the 
higher rate applicable to ordinary income.”  Id. at 685.  In actuality, Arrowsmith did not limit the 
amount of the deduction to account for the lower tax rate applicable to the income to which the 
deduction related.  See Arrowsmith v. Comm’r, 344 U.S. 6, 8-9 (1952); United States v. Skelly Oil 
Co., 394 U.S. 678, 698 n.6 (1969) (Stewart, J., dissenting).  Instead, it gave the deduction the same 
character as the income and thereby subjected it to separate rules limiting capital loss deductions.  
See id.  For a critique of an expansive reading of Arrowsmith, see Rabinovitz, supra note 148, at 87-
88.   
 164. The Second and Ninth Circuits had earlier rendered decisions in cases where a capital-
gain transaction generated additional income in subsequent years.  Part of the proceeds received in 
the original transactions had unascertainable values.  The subsequent proceeds, if viewed in 
isolation, would not qualify for capital gains treatment because they did not arise from a sale or 
exchange in the year they were received.  Both courts held that the income received in later years 
was capital gain based on the character of the original transaction.  See Comm’r v. Carter, 170 F.2d 
911 (2d Cir. 1948); Westover v. Smith, 173 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1949).  Although these cases are often 
considered “open transaction” cases the courts’ decisions on the character of the income is closely 
related to the later promulgated Arrowsmith doctrine.  See supra note 106 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the open transaction doctrine.  
 165. I.R.C. § 162(f) (2006). 
 166. Id. (emphasis added). 
 167. S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 274 (1969).  The Supreme Court, prior to the enactment of section 
162(f), held that fines paid by a trucking firm to a state for violations of vehicle weight rules were 
not deductible.  See Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Comm’r, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).  Judicial 
determinations that the deductibility of certain expenditures would run counter to some public 
policy were often inconsistent and unpredictable.  See generally James W. Colliton, The Tax 
Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments, 9 VA. TAX REV. 273, 275-76 (1989).  
Deductions have been allowed in various settings that would seemingly raise objections on public 
policy grounds.  See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 82-74, 1982-1 C.B. 110 (allowing a deductible loss for 
restitution payments made by an arsonist); Rev. Rul. 65-254, 1965-2 C.B. 50 (allowing a deduction 
for the return of embezzled funds).  It appears that the Internal Revenue Service and the courts have 
foregone any resort to broad public policy rationales in denying deductions for payments made in 
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Repayments of compensation should have little trouble navigating 
the statutory requirements for deductibility.  However, in many cases, if 
not most, the tax benefit that results from the deduction will not yield the 
benefit that would have been obtained had the compensation income 
reported in an earlier year been reduced.  In addition to the possibility 
that the tax rates to which the taxpayer is subject may have changed 
between the year of income recognition and the year of the reported 
deduction, the tax code places a number of restrictions on deductions.168  
For example, an individual’s deduction for repaid compensation would 
be classified as a miscellaneous itemized deduction, deductible only to 
the extent such deductions exceed two percent of adjusted gross income 
and would be subject to phase-out based on the taxpayer’s income 
level.169  Moreover, miscellaneous itemized deductions may not provide 
much, if any, benefit if the taxpayer is subject to the alternative-
minimum tax.170  In fact, a significant level of such deductions may 
trigger the application of this tax. 171  If, under Arrowsmith, the 
deduction is considered a capital loss, it is deductible only to the extent 
of capital gains plus $3,000.172  Any excess loss is available for 
 
restitution and instead have allowed I.R.C. § 162(f) to establish the parameters of public policy in 
this respect.  In other settings, equitable doctrines may have vitality.  See Craig M. Boise, Playing 
with “Monopoly Money”: Phony Profits, Fraud, Penalties, and Equity, 90 MINN. L. REV. 144 
(2005).  On occasion, deductions related to an activity are categorically denied.  See I.R.C. § 280E 
(2006) (denying any deduction or credit for amounts paid or incurred in carrying on the trade or 
business of narcotics trafficking).  
 168. It is possible, of course, that the individual is subject to higher marginal tax rates in the 
year of repayment, thereby, all things being equal, rendering the deduction more valuable. 
 169. I.R.C. §§ 67(a); 68 (2006).  Trade or business expenses are deductible in arriving at 
adjusted gross income.  However, trade or business expenses incurred by an employee are 
deductible only from adjusted gross income as itemized deductions.  I.R.C. § 62(a)(1) (2006).  
Certain exceptions are provided for employee business expenses but none are relevant to repaid 
compensation.  See I.R.C. § 62(a)(2) (2006).  Miscellaneous itemized deductions are defined as all 
itemized deductions other than those specifically excepted.  Repaid compensation does not fall 
within one of the enumerated exceptions.  See I.R.C. § 67(b) (2006).  Section 68 may cause up to 80 
percent of miscellaneous itemized deductions to be lost depending on the level of the taxpayer’s 
adjusted gross income.  I.R.C. § 68(a) (2006).  
 170. The alternative-minimum tax is a tax imposed on an expanded tax base.  The tax is 
imposed only if it exceeds the tax liability of the taxpayer determined under regular tax rules and 
only on the amount of such excess.  Generally speaking, this tax is designed to limit the ability of 
taxpayers to utilize certain statutory tax benefits to minimize their tax liability.  See generally I.R.C. 
§§ 55-59 (2006).  Miscellaneous itemized deductions are not deductible in computing the 
alternative-minimum tax.  I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006).  A detailed discussion of this tax is 
beyond the scope of this work.  This tax has particular relevance with respect to incentive stock 
options.  See infra notes 274-278 and accompanying text.   
 171. I.R.C. § 1211(b) (2006).  
 172. Id. 
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carryover to succeeding tax years and is subject to this limitation in each 
successive year.173   
b.  Section 1341 
Congress enacted Section 1341 in 1954 in an effort to mitigate the 
potential inequities that may arise from the strict adherence to the annual 
accounting principle.174  Section 1341 provides that the tax benefit 
resulting from the deduction for the return of previously taxed income 
will at least equal the reduction in tax that would have resulted had the 
income reported in a previous year or years been excluded from 
income.175  In effect, Section 1341 attempts to place the taxpayer in the 
same position she would have been in had the return for a previous year 
or years been amended.176  
Section 1341 imposes three requirements.177  First, an item must 
have been included in gross income for a prior taxable year because it 
appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to such income.178  
 
 173. 26 U.S.C.A. § 1212(b) (West 2009). 
 174. See H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 4025-26 (1954).  
 175. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(4)-(5) (2006).  If the tax benefit of the deduction in the year of repayment 
exceeds the benefit resulting from the exclusion of the income in a prior year or years, the taxpayer 
is entitled to the benefit of the current deduction.  Id.  
 176. If the exclusion of income from a prior year causes a net operating loss, then the decrease 
in tax resulting from the exclusion is determined by carrying back and forward the loss pursuant to 
I.R.C. § 172.  I.R.C. § 1341(b)(4)(B) (2006).  However, the parallel to filing an amended return is 
not complete.  Any refund of tax due as a result of the exclusion of income from a prior year is 
considered to be a refund of taxes paid in the current year.  I.R.C. § 1341(b)(1) (2006). 
 177. Section 1341 is inapplicable to deductions that relate to income resulting from the sale of 
inventory with exceptions for certain refunds or rebates made by regulated utilities with respect to 
rates.  I.R.C. § 1341(b)(2) (2006).  Likewise, this section is applicable neither to deductions 
attributable to bad debts nor to deductions attributable to legal fees and other expenses incurred by 
the taxpayer in contesting the restoration of an item previously included in income.  Treas. Reg. § 
1.1341-1(g)-(h) (1996). 
 178. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2006).  A recent case involved the application of I.R.C. § 1341 to 
deductions that the taxpayer asserted should have been deducted in prior years. Section 1341 is 
limited to income received under a claim of right.  Alcoa incurred waste disposal expenses during 
the period 1940-1987 and included those costs in its cost of goods sold calculation.   Alcoa, Inc. v. 
United States, 509 F.3d 173, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2007).  In 1993 Alcoa incurred substantial 
environmental cleanup costs pursuant to various statutes, including the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980.   Id. at 175.  Alcoa, in a novel 
argument, asserted that the cleanup costs incurred in 1993 should have been part of the cost of 
goods sold during the 1940-1987 period.  Id. at 179 n.6.  Costs of goods sold are deducted from 
gross receipts to arrive at gross income.  Consequently, Alcoa argued that the failure to take the 
deductions in earlier years resulted in additional income subject to tax.  Id. at 179.  If the costs were 
reported in such period, Alcoa would have received greater tax benefits from the deductions than 
those it would have obtained by deducting such costs in the year incurred, 1993.  Id.  As a result, 
Alcoa argued it was entitled to the benefits of I.R.C. § 1341.  Alcoa, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d 
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Second, a deduction must be allowable in the taxable year because it was 
established, after the close of the prior taxable year, that the taxpayer did 
not, in fact, have an unrestricted right to all or a portion of the income.179  
Finally, the deduction must exceed $3,000.180  
The requirement that the taxpayer have an apparent unrestricted 
right to the income in the year of receipt precludes the applicability of 
Section 1341 to deductions arising from the repayment of embezzled 
funds or from the repayment of income received as a result of arithmetic 
errors in billing. 181  In neither case does the taxpayer have an apparent 
right to the income—they have no right to the income at all.  The 
Internal Revenue Service’s position is that a taxpayer cannot have an 
apparent right to income obtained by fraudulent means but judicial 
guidance on this issue has been somewhat inconsistent.182  As discussed 
subsequently, the requirement that a taxpayer have an apparent right to 
income precludes, in most cases, the application of Section 1341 to the 
forfeiture of income that was previously taxed as a result of the taxpayer 
making an I.R.C. § 83(b) election.183 
At the other end of spectrum, Section 1341 is unavailable for 
deductions attributable to restorations of income for which the taxpayer 
had an actual, as opposed to an apparent, right.184  If the obligation to 
restore income arises from a subsequent transaction, then the taxpayer’s 
right to income may be deemed absolute at the time of its receipt.  For 
example, a taxpayer was not entitled to the benefits of Section 1341 for a 
deduction attributable to the refund of prepaid interest that was required 
 
173, 179-80 (3d Cir. 2007).  The Third Circuit denied Alcoa’s claim and held that, in order for 
I.R.C. § 1341 to apply, the repayment must arise from the same circumstances, terms, and 
conditions as the original item.  Id.   
 179. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(2) (2006). 
 180. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(3) (2006). 
 181. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-153, 1968-1 C.B. 371, 373; McKinney v. United States, 574 F.2d 
1240 (5th Cir. 1978); Yerkie v. Comm’r, 67 T.C. 388, 392 (1976).  See also Perez v. United States, 
553 F. Supp. 558, 561 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (holding that I.R.C. § 1341 was not applicable to 
repayments of illegal kickbacks). 
 182. See Charlie Boer, The Right Intention but the Wrong Result: The Misapplication of 
Section 1341 in Cooper v. United States, 59 TAX LAW. 1109 (2006) (discussing Cooper v. United 
States in which the court refused to impute taxpayer wrongdoing to a trustee in bankruptcy); Jessica 
K. Blosser & David W. Freeland, Pro-Taxpayer Decision on Claim-of-Right Relief, 36 TAX 
ADVISER 197 (2005) (describing the Court of Federal Claims allowance of I.R.C. § 1341 for 
deductions attributable to price fixing settlement payments); William L. Raby, Taxpayer 
Repayments and the Tax Benefit Rule, 97 TAX NOTES 1183 (2002) (noting the Tax Court’s refusal 
to establish a per se disallowance of I.R.C. § 1341 in the case of repayments of illegal income). 
 183. See infra notes 286-289 and accompanying text.  
 184. See generally I.R.C. § 1341. 
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because the loan to which the interest related was prepaid.185  The 
regulatory denial of Section 1341 for bad-debt expenses manifests this 
position.186  The Internal Revenue Service has not been consistent in its 
position with respect to repayment liabilities triggered by subsequent 
events.  On the one hand, it has argued that Section 1341 is inapplicable 
to repayments of compensation if the obligation to repay the 
compensation was triggered by a subsequent finding that the 
compensation expense was not deductible by the employer—a position 
with which the Sixth Circuit disagrees.187  On the other hand, the 
Internal Revenue Service has allowed the use of Section 1341 with 
respect to commissions repaid as a result of the subsequent failure of 
customers to pay for the sales on which the commissions were earned.188 
A host of issues may arise with respect to the applicability of 
Section 1341 to repayments of compensation pursuant to a contractual 
clawback provision.  Repayments pursuant to retroactive clawback 
provisions whose reach extend to periods antedating the agreement may 
not be eligible for Section 1341 treatment—at least with respect to 
compensation earned prior to the execution of the agreement.189  A 
strong case can be made for the fact that, at the time of its receipt, the 
taxpayer had more than an apparent right to the income.  If a clawback is 
triggered by a restatement of earnings and the taxpayer had a hand in 
fraudulently reporting the earnings then, arguably, the taxpayer had no 
right, apparent or otherwise, to the income.190  Difficult questions are 
also posed by clawback provisions that are triggered with the benefit of 
hindsight, but that do not result in restatements.  For example, if income 
must be restored because of subsequent losses or because it is found that 
the taxpayer took undue risk, then it is unclear whether Section 1341 
should apply.  It is arguable that, at the time the compensation was 
received, the taxpayer had more than an apparent right to the income and 
the triggering of the clawback was precipitated by subsequent events.  
 
 185. Rev. Rul. 58-226, 1958-1 C.B. 318.  See also supra note 178 (discussing a recent case, 
Alcoa, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d. 173 (3d Cir. 2007), in which the Third Circuit denied the 
taxpayer the benefit of I.R.C. § 1341 for environmental remediation costs).  
 186. See supra note 177.  
 187. See Rev. Rul. 69-115, 1969-1 C.B. 50; Rev. Rul. 67-437, 1967-2 C.B. 296; Van Cleave v. 
United States, 718 F. 2d 193, 197 (6th Cir. 1983).  See supra note 141 for a discussion of 
repayments due to the Internal Revenue Service’s denial of a corporate deduction for compensation 
payments. 
 188. Rev. Rul. 72-78, 1972-1 C.B. 45. 
 189. See Blanton v. Comm’r, 46 T.C. 527 (1966).  
 190. The application of accounting standards often requires the exercise of judgment.  Proving 
that a taxpayer intentionally inflated earnings rather than encountered a bout of undue optimism 
may be quite difficult.  
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This position is probably strongest in the case a clawback is triggered by 
subsequent losses.  It is certainly plausible that a clawback triggered by a 
determination that the taxpayer undertook undue risk rendered the right 
to the compensation more apparent than real.  Presumably, the undue 
risk was taken in the same year that the compensation was earned 
despite the fact that the determination of the presence of such risk was 
made subsequently.  The uncertainty surrounding the application of 
Section 1341 places executives who forfeit compensation that has not 
been subject to tax in a favorable position when compared to those 
executives who are forced to disgorge previously taxed compensation.  
Section 1341 also requires that a deduction must be allowable to the 
taxpayer in the taxable year because it was established, after the close of 
the prior taxable year, that the taxpayer did not, in fact, have an 
unrestricted right to all or a portion of the income.191  Section 1341 does 
not create independent grounds for deducting an expense or loss.192  
However, provided the repayment is involuntary, little difficulty should 
arise in finding independent grounds for the deductibility of 
compensation repayments.193  Moreover, the deductibility of repayments 
should be unaffected by the wrongdoing, or lack thereof, of the taxpayer 
in receiving the income in question.194 
Section 1341 is a fail-safe provision for taxpayers. In the event a 
current tax deduction yields greater tax benefits in the year of repayment 
under standard tax rules, the taxpayer is entitled to those benefits and is 
not limited to the benefits that would have arisen had the income been 
excluded in the year it was recognized.  Whether Section 1341 is 
beneficial depends on the taxpayer’s particular circumstances in both the 
year of income recognition and the year of repayment.  However, 
repayments of significant amounts of compensation will likely cause the 
taxpayer to seek refuge in Section 1341.  As previously discussed, 
various limitations on itemized deductions and the application of the 
alternative-minimum tax may dramatically reduce the value of the tax 
 
 191. See infra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 192. Although the statutory language is relatively clear, the regulations unambiguously lead to 
this conclusion.  Section 1341 will apply only “[i]f, during the taxable year, the taxpayer is entitled 
under other provisions of Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code to a deduction of more than 
$3,000 . . . .”  Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1(a)(1) (1996) (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court has 
similarly interpreted Section 1341.  See United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 683 (1969) 
(stating that “the use of the words ‘a deduction’ and the placement of § 1341 in subchapter Q—the 
subchapter dealing largely with side effects of the annual accounting system—make it clear that it is 
necessary to refer to other portions of the Code to discover how much of a deduction is allowable”). 
 193. See supra notes 131-142 and accompanying text.  
 194. See supra notes 165-167 and accompanying text.  
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deduction in relation to the amount of tax imposed on the income in an 
earlier year.195  Moreover, in the event the income restored was capital in 
nature, the Arrowsmith doctrine may reduce the benefit of the deduction 
to insignificance.196  In the current economic environment, taxpayers 
with healthy amounts of capital gains are likely to be few and far 
between.  
The extent to which repaid compensation is deductible and the 
nature of the deduction is dependent upon the original tax treatment of 
the compensation income which has been clawed back.  Likewise, the 
benefit of Section 1341 is similarly dependent. Section 1341 yields a 
benefit that mirrors the original tax incurred on the income in question.  
The taxation of performance-based compensation is highly dependent on 
the form of such compensation.  Significant differences in the timing of 
income recognition and the character of the income will result in 
concomitant differences in the deductions available upon repayment.  
C. Taxation of Performance-Based Compensation  
The tax consequences of performance-based compensation that has 
been subject to clawback will depend, to a great extent, on the tax 
consequences to the employee upon the receipt of the compensation.  
Performance-based compensation is payable either in cash or property.  
Compensation payable in cash generally takes the form of a cash bonus 
or stock appreciation rights.  Bonus payments are usually, but not 
always, determined on the basis of pre-defined metrics that vary 
depending on the nature of the employer’s business and the incentives 
which such employer seeks to put in place.  Commonly employed 
metrics include firm- or unit-wide measures such as return on equity, net 
earnings, market share, sales growth, and the like.  Metrics that focus on 
individual or group performance are also prevalent.197  Stock-
appreciation rights determine compensation based on the growth of the 
firm’s stock price between the date such rights are granted and the date 
such rights are exercised.198  Property-based compensation arrangements 
typically grant employees employer stock or options to purchase 
 
 195. See supra notes 168-173 and accompanying text. 
 196. See supra notes 151-164 and accompanying text. 
 197. Performance-based compensation is not subject to the $1 million limit on the deductibility 
of certain executive compensation. See infra note 250 and accompanying text.  
 198. Stock appreciation rights may also credit the employee with dividends that are paid on the 
stock.  
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employer stock.199  The tax issues incident to cash compensation 
arrangements are generally limited to the timing of the employee’s 
income inclusion.  The receipt of employer stock or options on such 
stock raise additional issues.    
1.  Cash Compensation 
Performance-based compensation payable in cash is taxable to the 
recipient in the year such compensation is actually or constructively 
received.200  Income is constructively received by a taxpayer if such 
income is credited to her account, set apart for her, or otherwise made 
available to be drawn upon without substantial limitations or 
restrictions.201  It is not uncommon for employers to defer all or a 
portion of the incentive compensation or, alternatively, to offer the 
recipients the option to defer all or a portion of such compensation.  The 
specifics of the deferral arrangements vary from firm to firm, but 
generally deferral arrangements provide specific timeframes under 
 
 199. The term “employer stock” includes stock of the parent corporation in cases where the 
employees are employed by a controlled subsidiary of the parent.   
 200. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (1999).  It is assumed that the employee utilizes the cash-basis of 
method of accounting.  Id.  The cash basis method of accounting is used by virtually all individuals.  
Self-employed individuals may elect, or be required to, utilize the accrual method of accounting for 
their business operations.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(2)(i) (2006) (mandating accrual accounting 
for purchases and sales if the taxpayer maintains an inventory).  Individuals may also recognize 
income on the accrual basis by virtue of reporting their share of partnership income if such 
partnership utilizes the accrual method of accounting.  See generally I.R.C. §§ 702; 703(b) (2006).  
Under the accrual method of accounting, income is recognized at the time all the events have 
occurred that fix the right to receive such income and the amount thereof can be determined with 
reasonable accuracy.  Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (1999).  The employer, in most instances, will be an 
accrual-basis taxpayer.  Therefore, the employer’s compensation deduction may be accrued at the 
time various statutory tests are met.  In general, expenses are accruable at the time economic 
performance has taken place.  Generally, economic performance will occur at the time the services 
to which the liability relates have been rendered.  See I.R.C. § 461(h)(2)(A)(i) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 
1.461-4(d)(6) (1999).  However, accruals for compensation expense are generally limited to 
amounts that are paid within two and one-half months after the end of the corporation’s taxable 
year.  See Temp. Treas. Reg. 1.404(b)-1T, A-2(b)(1) (1992).  
 201. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1979).  Generally, a taxpayer will be deemed to be in constructive 
receipt of income if the funds are set aside and not subject to the general claims of the employer’s 
creditors or if the agreement to defer income is executed after the services that give rise to the claim 
for compensation are rendered.  See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 70-435, 1970-2 C.B. 100; Rev. Rul. 64-279, 
1964-2 C.B. 121; Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C. B. 174.  Section 409A, discussed at infra notes 203-
219 and accompanying text, imposes additional requirements on the ability to defer compensation.  
The doctrine of constructive receipt should not be confused with the constructive realization of 
income.  In certain cases, statutory rules require that income be realized prior to the time that such 
income would have been realized under general income realization principles.  For example, mark-
to-market accounting rules will result in income realization despite the absence of a transaction that 
results in a disposition of the asset in question.  See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 475; 1256 (2006).  
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which the deferred amounts may be withdrawn, may provide for interest 
accruals on the amounts deferred, and may provide offsets for amounts 
payable under qualified plans.  Amounts deferred may also be subject to 
substantial risk of forfeiture due to, for example, a continuing 
employment requirement.  Whether, and to what extent, bonus-deferral 
arrangements succeed in postponing the employee’s incidence of 
taxation depends on whether the deferral arrangements meet the 
requirements of Internal Revenue Code Section 409A.  Prior to the 
enactment of Section 409A, the only obstacle to the postponement of 
income recognition that such arrangements faced was the doctrine of 
constructive receipt—an obstacle easily avoided.202 
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004203 added Section 409A to 
the Internal Revenue Code to combat perceived abuses in the design and 
operation of deferred-compensation plans.204  Particular opprobrium was 
directed at deferred-compensation plans or arrangements that granted 
employees a great deal of control or access to amounts deferred and 
those plans or arrangements designed to effectively shield assets of the 
employer from the claims of creditors.205  Section 409A imposes certain 
operational and design requirements on deferred compensation plans 
within its scope.206  The statute has a broad reach, encompassing any 
plan, other than those specifically exempted, that provides for the 
 
 202. Unfunded deferred compensation arrangements, if properly implemented, generally raise 
no constructive-receipt issues because the employee has received nothing more than the employer’s 
unsecured promise to pay the compensation at some future point in time.  Funded deferred-
compensation plans will also not result in constructive receipt provided, among other requirements, 
that the assets held by the employer to secure the obligation to pay the deferred compensation are 
subject to the claims of the employer’s creditors.  The Internal Revenue Service has issued guidance 
and a model trust agreements for these funded arrangements, known as “Rabbi Trusts.”  See Rev. 
Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422.  
 203. Pub. L. No. 108-357, §885(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1634-41 (2004). 
 204. This provision does not override other statutory provisions or any other rule of law that 
would require income to be recognized earlier than the time required by § 409A.  See I.R.C. § 
409A(c) (2006).  The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 801, 
122 Stat. 3765, 3929-30 (2008), added § 457A to the Internal Revenue Code.  This provision 
requires recognition of income from nonqualified deferred compensation plans maintained by 
certain tax-indifferent corporations and partnerships at the time the income is no longer subject to a 
substantial risk of forfeiture.  In general, deferred-compensation plans of foreign corporations and 
partnerships that allocate more than an insubstantial portion of their income to foreign corporations 
and tax-exempt entities are subject to § 457A.  Exceptions are made for foreign corporations that are 
subject to a comprehensive foreign income tax or that earn substantially all of their income in 
connection with the conduct of a trade or business in the United States. See generally Notice 2009-
8, 2009-4 I.R.B. 347, § 6, Question 6 (Jan. 26, 2009).  
 205. H.R. REP. NO. 108-548, pt.1, at 343 (2004). 
 206. See infra note 208 and accompanying text. 
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deferral of compensation.207  Effective for amounts deferred after 
December 31, 2004, Section 409A(a)(1) requires that all compensation 
deferred under the plan for the taxable year and all preceding taxable 
years be included in gross income during the taxable year in which the 
deferred compensation plan fails to meet the requirements specified in 
the statute.208  Moreover, interest is imposed on the amount of 
compensation included in gross income pursuant to this provision in 
addition to a twenty percent penalty on the amount so included.209 
Regulations implementing the statute provide that a deferral of 
compensation exists if, under the terms of the plan and the relevant facts 
and circumstances, the service provider has a legally binding right to 
compensation during the taxable year and such compensation is payable, 
pursuant to the terms of the plan, in a later year.210  
In the event the service recipient or other person may eliminate or 
unilaterally reduce the compensation due to the service provider, then no 
 
 207. Qualified employer plans, such as pension and profit sharing plans, as well as bona fide 
vacation, sick leave, compensatory time, disability pay, and death benefit plans are not subject to 
these provisions.  See I.R.C. § 409A(d)(1)-(2) (2006).  The I.R.S. has broad regulatory authority to 
exempt arrangements from the application of § 409A if such arrangements will not result in 
improper deferral of U.S. tax and do not place assets beyond the reach of creditors.  I.R.C. § 
409A(e)(3) (2006).  Recently issued regulations exempt various medical reimbursement 
arrangements and medical savings accounts from the application of § 409A.  See generally Treas. 
Reg. § 1.409A-1(a)(5) (2007).  The regulations also exclude from § 409A deferral arrangements that 
arise due to customary payroll procedures.  For example, compensation is not deemed deferred 
solely because the service provider is paid after the last day of such provider’s taxable year if such 
payment is made under normal payroll timing procedures.  Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(3) (2007).  
Also not subject to § 409A are short-term deferrals.  Absent an election to defer by the service 
provider, compensation actually or constructively received by the later of the fifteenth day of the 
third month following the end of the service provider’s first taxable year in which the amount is no 
longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture or the fifteenth day of the third month following the 
end of the service recipient’s first taxable year in which the amount is no longer subject to a 
substantial risk of forfeiture is not subject to section 409A.  Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(4)(i) (2007). 
 208. Deferred compensation includes earnings, whether actual or notional, attributable to 
deferred compensation or income.  I.R.C. § 409A(d)(5) (2006).  A plan failure will not result in the 
application of this provision to all participants, only to those individuals to whom the plan failure 
relates.  I.R.C. § 409A(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2006).  Proposed regulations were recently issued that provide 
guidance on the calculation of required income inclusions and penalties for noncompliant plans.  
See generally Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-4, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,380 (Dec. 8, 2008).  Note that the 
Internal Revenue Service will not issue rulings on whether a particular nonqualified deferred 
compensation plan is subject to § 409A. See Rev. Proc. 2009-3, 2009-1 I.R.B. 107 (Jan. 5, 2009).   
 209. I.R.C. § 409A(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006).  Interest is determined by applying the underpayment 
rate plus one percentage point to underpayments that would have resulted had the deferred-
compensation amounts been included in the tax year deferred or, if later, in the taxable year such 
deferred compensation was no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.  I.R.C. § 
409A(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 210. Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(1) (2007).  
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legally binding right to the compensation exists.211  However, if the 
unilateral right to reduce or eliminate the compensation is exercisable 
only upon a condition, or if such discretion lacks substantive 
significance, then such right is ignored.212  The regulations state: 
“[C]ompensation is not considered subject to unilateral reduction or 
elimination merely because it may be reduced or eliminated by operation 
of the objective terms of the plan, such as application of a 
nondiscretionary, objective provision creating a substantial risk of 
forfeiture.”213  
Deferred-compensation plans subject to an objective, 
nondiscretionary clawback feature, such as those triggered by earnings 
restatements, will, therefore, be subject to Section 409A, despite the fact 
that all or a portion of the compensation may be forfeited.  It is not clear, 
however, whether clawbacks triggered by the application of vague, 
generalized standards, such as those applicable to the undertaking of 
excessive or undue risk, will be considered sufficiently nondiscretionary 
and objective for this purpose.  It is hard to imagine that an employer’s 
discretion in asserting clawback rights in such situations would be 
unfettered.  At a minimum, there would appear to be duty of good faith 
and, perhaps, a reasonable-person standard in assessing whether the 
employee took on excessive or undue risk.  Many clawback provisions 
are applicable at the discretion of the board of directors and, depending 
on the specific terms of such provisions and the extent of the board’s 
discretion, it is possible that Section 409A may not apply to deferred 
compensation subject to such clawback provisions—at least while the 
compensation is subject to clawback.214  
A detailed analysis of Section 409A is beyond the scope of this 
work.  In general terms, three design and operational requirements are 
imposed on covered nonqualified deferred compensation 
arrangements.215  First, the plan may not permit early distributions, as 
defined.216  Second, the plan may not permit the acceleration of benefits 
 
 211. Id.  
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. (emphasis added). 
 214. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 
 215. See infra notes 216-218 and accompanying text. 
 216. A plan may not permit deferred compensation to be distributed earlier than separation 
from service, disability, death, a specified time pursuant to a fixed schedule specified in the plan, 
change in control events, or the occurrence of an unforeseeable emergency.  I.R.C. § 
409A(a)(2)(A)(i)-(vi) (2006).  
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except as otherwise permitted.217  Finally, deferral elections, and certain 
changes thereto, must be made within prescribed time frames.218  
Nonqualified deferred compensation plans subject to Section 409A may 
provide participants with deferral elections only if the election to defer is 
made by the end of the preceding taxable year or such other time 
provided in regulations.219  
In the event that a taxpayer is required, pursuant to a clawback 
provision, to return cash compensation to the employer, the tax 
consequences of the repayment will depend on several factors.  The most 
straightforward scenario would involve the repayment of a cash bonus 
earned in prior years but subject to repayment through no fault of the 
employee.  For example, the repayment obligation may be triggered by a 
restatement of earnings upon which the bonus was calculated, and the 
restatement was not caused by any action of the employee obligated to 
repay the compensation.  A repayment under these circumstances would 
be deductible and, moreover, should be eligible to the benefits offered 
by Section 1341.  At the time the bonus was received, the employee had 
an apparent, but not absolute right, to the income.220  The fact that the 
 
 217. Pursuant to the terms of the plan, an initial deferral election, or subsequent deferral 
election, payments may be accelerated due to separation from service, death, disability, change on 
control, or unforeseeable emergencies.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-3(j) (2007).  Payments may be 
made to a person other than the service provider pursuant to a domestic relations order.  Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.409A-3(j)(4)(ii) (2007).  Payments may also be made to comply with an order of divestiture due 
to conflicts of interest pursuant to I.R.C. § 1043 or, for arrangements subject to I.R.C. § 457(f), to 
pay taxes upon a vesting event.  Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-3(j)(4)(iii)-(iv) (2007).  Moreover, payments 
may be made to pay certain employment taxes or to the extent of amounts included in gross income 
as a result of a plan failing to meet the requirements of § 409A. Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-3(j)(4)(vi)-
(vii) (2007).  The rules also provide service recipients with a modicum of flexibility by allowing 
such service recipients to unilaterally pay amounts due to separated participants in lump sum form.  
Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-3(j)(4)(v) (2007). 
 218. Participants in their first year of eligibility under the plan may elect to defer within thirty 
days of their eligibility date.  I.R.C. § 409A(a)(4)(B)(i) (2006).  In the case of performance-based 
compensation covering a period of at least twelve months, a participant may elect to defer 
compensation no later than six months before the end of the service period.  I.R.C. § 
409A(a)(4)(B)(iii) (2006).  Service providers who are awarded bonuses or other compensation in 
the middle of a year will find the general rule applicable to timing of deferral elections useless.  For 
example, an election to defer compensation under a bonus program instituted in 2008 that covers 
services provided in 2008 would have to be made by the service provider by December 31, 2007.  
Unless the service provider is unusually prescient, it is unlikely that such an election will have been 
made.  The regulations, however, provide that an election to defer compensation subject to a 
substantial risk of forfeiture due to a condition requiring at least twelve months of continued service 
by the service provider may be made within thirty days after the service provider obtains a legally 
binding right to payment and within at least twelve months prior to the earliest date that the 
forfeiture condition could lapse.  Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-2(a)(5) (2007). 
 219. I.R.C. § 409A(a)(4)(B)(i) (2006). 
 220. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.  
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employee had no right to the income was established after the close of 
the taxable year in which the income was received.221  Assuming the 
amount of compensation repaid exceeds $3,000, Section 1341 should 
apply.222  
The application of Section 1341 is less clear in the event that the 
taxpayer bore some level of culpability for the earnings restatement or if 
the clawback is triggered by subsequent events.  In the event that the 
employee, through deliberate action, knowingly falsified earnings or 
other relevant metrics in order to increase the bonus payable, then a 
strong case may be made that Section 1341 should be inapplicable.  In 
such a case, the employee had no right to the income, apparent or 
otherwise.223  Generally, only high-level employees have the 
wherewithal to doctor earnings.  However, in certain cases, lower-level 
employees may have significant sway over the metrics upon which a 
bonus is determined.224  For example, a bonus based on gross revenues, 
growth in gross revenues, or gross revenues in excess of a pre-defined 
threshold may tempt employees to inflate sales through improper 
techniques—channel stuffing, for example.225  Section 1341 should be 
denied in such cases.  The more localized the metrics, the greater the 
control that can be exercised by lower-level employees.226  
 
 221. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 223. See supra notes 181-182 and accompanying text. 
 224. See infra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 225. Channel stuffing refers to the practice of placing larger quantities of inventory than 
needed by a customer, coupled with a side agreement that the excess inventory will be returned.  
Other techniques for inflating revenue include mischaracterization of contract terms and bifurcation 
of contracts to allow sellers with on-going service obligations to recognize greater revenue from 
transactions than would otherwise be appropriate.  The software industry is particularly vulnerable 
to such practices.  See generally RECOGNITION AND MEASUREMENT IN FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 5, § 83(b) (Fin. 
Accounting Standards Bd. 1984); SOFTWARE REVENUE RECOGNITION, STATEMENT OF POSITION 
97-2 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1977); Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements, 
SEC STAFF ACCOUNTING BULLETIN NO. 101 (Dec. 3, 1999), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab101.htm.  “Round-tripping” is another form of revenue 
manipulation.  A “round-trip” transaction is one in which the purchaser receives funds from the 
seller and undertakes a reciprocal obligation to purchase goods or services from the seller.  See, e.g., 
David D. Kirkpatrick, Shares Are Up, But Lawsuits May Unsettle AOL’s Future, N.Y. TIMES, July 
7, 2003, at C1 (reporting on litigation commenced against AOL for purportedly inflating revenue by 
$190 million through “round-trip” transactions).  See also Daniel V. Dooley, Financial Fraud: 
Accounting Theory and Practice, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 53 (2002). 
 226. Metrics that are based on the performance of a single unit or division may be influenced 
by employees in the unit or division.  At the extreme, metrics based on individual performance 
measurements are susceptible to influence by the individual employee to whom the metric relates.  
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A more contentious issue will arise if the clawback is triggered by 
subsequent events.  For many reasons, earnings that are properly 
reported in an earlier period may ultimately prove ephemeral with the 
benefit of hindsight.  However, the prior year earnings may not be 
subject to restatement.  Instead, losses are recognized in a later period.  
The current predicament in which many financial institutions find 
themselves has been caused, in large part, by seemingly profitable 
transactions ultimately proving unprofitable as a result of subsequent 
events.  Clawbacks triggered under such circumstances may not be 
eligible for Section 1341 treatment.  The Internal Revenue Service is 
likely to argue that, at the time that the compensation was earned, the 
taxpayer had an absolute, not apparent, right to the income.227  If an 
employer finds it necessary to institute a clawback to recoup income in 
such circumstances then it may behoove the employer to defer the bonus 
until it can be determined, with the benefit of hindsight, whether it has, 
in fact, been earned.  Not paying the bonus in the first place is much 
cleaner than paying it and subsequently requesting the employee to pay 
it back.228   
If the clawback provision causes the forfeiture of deferred cash 
compensation then, unless the requirements of section 409A have not 
been met throughout the deferral period, the clawback provision will 
have no tax consequences.229  Because the income has never been 
realized by the employee, its subsequent forfeiture is a non-event—tax 
wise, at least.  If, however, Section 409A served to accelerate the 
taxation of the deferred compensation then the tax consequences of the 
forfeiture of the deferred compensation would be similar to those 
discussed above with respect to cash bonuses.230  As mentioned 
previously, Section 409A also imposes, in addition to the regular tax on 
the deferred earnings, an interest charge and twenty percent penalty.231  
If Section 1341 applies, the statutory language allows for the 
recoupment of the interest and penalty.  The benefit derived under 
Section 1341 is determined by the “the decrease in tax under this 
chapter” that would have resulted if the income had not been reported in 
 
 227. See supra notes 185-187 and accompanying text. 
 228. This is a common practice with respect to sales commissions.  Many employers remit 
commissions only after the sale on which the commissions were earned have been paid for by the 
customer.  
 229. This assumes, of course, that the employee was not in constructive receipt of the deferred 
income.  See supra note 201 and accompanying text.  
 230. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.  
 231. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
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the year of receipt.232  Section 409A states that “the tax imposed by this 
chapter” is increased by the interest and penalty.233  Therefore, the 
interest and penalty charges imposed under Section 409A are deemed 
taxes under Chapter 1 and, therefore, may be recouped by the 
application of Section 1341.234  
2.  Compensation Paid in Property.  
It is also common for performance-based compensation to be paid 
in property—typically employer stock or options on employer stock.  
Stock-based compensation systems are justified, in part, by the 
propensity of such arrangements to align the interests of management 
and shareholders—a justification that has, in recent years, been called 
into question.235  Section 409A is less of a concern with respect to equity 
based compensation because the regulations provide a broad exemption 
for certain equity based compensation arrangements.  For example, 
Treas. Reg. Section 1.409A-1(b)(5)(i)(A) exempts, from the application 
of section 409A, options to purchase service recipient stock subject to 
taxation under Section 83 provided that the number of shares subject to 
the option is fixed at the date of grant, the exercise price of the stock is 
not less than the fair market value of the stock on such date, and that no 
deferral feature, other than the deferral of income until exercise, is 
provided.236  In effect, provided that the option, at the date of grant, is 
not in the money and no deferral feature is provided, it will be exempt 
from Section 409A.237 
 
 232. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(5)(B) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 233. I.R.C. § 409A(a)(1)(B) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 234. This is not the case with respect to the 20 percent excise tax imposed on excess golden-
parachute payments pursuant to I.R.C. § 4999.  This tax is imposed under Chapter 46 and, therefore, 
is outside the scope of I.R.C. § 1341.  Consequently, the recipient of excess parachute payments 
subject to this tax would be unable to recoup this tax through the utilization of I.R.C. § 1341.  See 
I.R.C. § 4999(b) (2006) and 280G(b) (2006) for the definition of excess parachute payments.  
Golden-parachute payments have been restricted for recipients of federal bailout funds.  See supra 
notes 45 and 55 and accompanying text.  
 235. See, e.g., Bebchuk et. al., supra note 26.  Stock-based compensation schemes are also 
utilized to avoid the limitation on the deductibility of executive compensation and, in the case of 
stock options, offered financial accounting benefits.  See infra notes 248 and 251 and accompanying 
text.  
 236. The payment of the exercise price with previously acquired shares does not jeopardize the 
exemption.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(5)(i)(D) (2007). 
 237. Moreover, grants of incentive stock options or options granted under an employee stock 
purchase plan pursuant to I.R.C. § 423 are categorically exempted from § 409A.  Treas. Reg. §§ 
1.409A-1(b)(5)(i)(C); 1.409A-1(b)(5)(ii) (2007).  For a discussion of the taxation of incentive stock 
options see infra notes 251-69 and accompanying text.  Similar rules are applicable to stock 
appreciation rights.  Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(5)(i)(B) (2007).  The receipt of stock subject to a 
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Internal Revenue Code Section 83(a) provides the general rule that the 
actual or constructive receipt of property in exchange for services is a taxable 
event at the time the property so received is transferable by the recipient or not 
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever occurs earlier.238  The 
amount of income recognized from such a transaction is the excess of the fair 
market value of the property received over the amount paid by the recipient 
for such property.239  Correspondingly, the transferor of the property is entitled 
to a compensation deduction, at the time the recipient of the property 
recognizes income, equal to the amount includible in the income of the 
recipient.240  Consequently, receipt of employer stock that is immediately 
vested with the employee results in income, at the time of receipt, equal to the 
fair market value of the stock received.241  
If, however, the stock is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, then 
income recognition is postponed until such time as the risk of forfeiture 
lapses.  A substantial risk of forfeiture may be present as a result of 
performance targets that must be met or by the presence of a continuing 
employment requirement. For executives whose compensation is subject to 
the $1 million deduction, limitations on performance-based restrictions are 
typical.242  For other employees, a continuing employment restriction may be 
the extent of the forfeiture risk.  For example, assume an employee received a 
 
substantial risk of forfeiture is generally not considered to result in a deferral of compensation for 
purposes of § 409A.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(6) (2007). 
 238. I.R.C. § 83(a)(1) (2006). 
 239. I.R.C. § 83(a)(1)-(2) (2006).  The fair market value of the property received is determined 
at the time the property is transferable by the recipient or is not subject to substantial risk of 
forfeiture, whichever is earlier.  I.R.C. § 83(a)(1) (2006).  Senator Carl Levin introduced legislation 
in 2007 that, for nonqualified stock options, would decouple the amount of the employer’s 
deduction from the amount of the employee’s income inclusion.  The employer’s deduction would 
be determined by the amount of compensation expense recognized for financial accounting 
purposes.  Moreover, the bill would eliminate the exemption of nonqualified stock options from the 
$1 million expense limitation imposed by I.R.C. § 162(m).  See Ending Corporate Tax Favors for 
Stock Options Act, S. 2116, 110th Cong. (2007).  
 240. I.R.C. § 83(h) (2006).  If appreciated or depreciated property is transferred to compensate 
for services received then the transferor will recognize a gain or loss on the transfer as if the 
property were sold for its fair market value.  Because a corporation recognizes no gain or loss on the 
transfer of its stock, or options thereon, this issue does not present itself in this context.  See I.R.C. § 
1032(a) (2006).  
 241. Any amount paid by the employee for the shares would, of course, reduce the amount of 
compensation.  
 242. See infra note 250 for a discussion of the $1 million deduction limitation and the 
exception to such limitation for performance-based compensation.  A grant of stock that is awarded 
without regard to some performance-based measurement will not qualify for the exception.  See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A) (1995).  Stock options, on the other hand, are deemed 
performance-based provided that they are not in-the-money when granted.  See infra note 250 and 
accompanying text.   
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grant of 10,000 shares of stock but the stock was subject to a four-year vesting 
schedule pursuant to which 25 percent of the stock vested on each of the first 
four anniversary dates of the grant.  The employee must be employed with the 
firm on the vesting dates.  Assuming that the employee remained with the 
firm throughout the vesting period, such employee would recognize income 
in each of the succeeding four years equal to the fair market value, determined 
at the time of vesting, of 2500 shares of employer stock.  It is likely that the 
trend toward “hold til (or through) retirement” policies, with respect to 
performance-based awards, will result in a significantly greater number of 
employees that are subject to vesting schedules for a portion of their 
compensation.243 
The postponement of taxation until the lapse of the vesting 
restrictions imposed under the plan could expose the employee to a 
significant tax liability if the stock’s value increases significantly 
between the time of grant and the time that the stock is no longer subject 
to substantial risk of forfeiture.  As a consequence, the benefits of capital 
gains tax rates and much, if not all, of the benefits of deferral may be 
lost with respect to the increase in value that occurs between the time of 
the stock’s grant and the date that the stock is no longer restricted.  
Moreover, in order to pay the tax, the employee may be forced to sell the 
stock which diminishes the incentive alignment that was a principle 
reason for the stock’s issuance.244  The governing statute, however, 
provides the property recipients with an alternative to the general rule.245 
Internal Revenue Code Section 83(b) offers the property recipient 
an election to accelerate the incidence of taxation to the time that the 
property is transferred.246  Subsequent appreciation would be taxable if, 
and when, the taxpayer disposes of the stock and would be taxed at 
capital-gain rates.  This election also accelerates the employer’s 
compensation deduction.  The election is not risk free, however. In a 
declining market, the option holder will have recognized an amount of 
 
 243. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.  
 244. After the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, employers could no longer make 
loans to any director or executive officer.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107-204, § 
402(a), 116 Stat. 745, 787 (2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k)(1) (2006)).  This 
provision removes a significant source of liquidity for many executives.  Id.  
 245. See I.R.C. § 83(b) (2006). 
 246. I.R.C. § 83(b) (2006).  Section 83 applies to any property transferred in connection with 
the performance of services even in cases where the service provider has paid fair market value for 
the property.  See Alves v. Comm’r, 734 F.2d 478, 479 (9th Cir. 1984).  Therefore, despite the fact 
that an employee has purchased restricted stock at the market price, in the absence of an I.R.C. § 
83(b) election, appreciation up to the point the restrictions lapse will cause the stockholder to 
recognize compensation income.  
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compensation income based on the value of the stock at the date of 
grant.  Any subsequent decline in the value of the stock will generate a 
capital loss upon disposition of the stock.247  Moreover, if the employee 
fails to meet the vesting requirements, no loss is recognized upon the 
forfeiture of the shares.248  
Nonqualified stock options are also a commonly used method of 
payment in performance-based compensation schemes.249  These 
instruments offer several benefits to both the recipient and grantor of the 
options.  For the grantor, these instruments allow compensation to avoid 
the limitation placed on deductions for executive compensation.250  
Moreover, until recently, payment of compensation in the form of stock 
options enjoyed favorable treatment for financial accounting purposes.251  
 
 247. Note that the election is irrevocable, except with the permission of the Commissioner.  
I.R.C. § 83(b)(2) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(f) (1978). 
 248. I.R.C. § 83(b) (2006). 
 249. Incentive stock options are not subject to the general tax rules set forth in I.R.C. § 83.  
These instruments are subject to different, very taxpayer-friendly rules and comprise a very limited 
part of executive compensation packages.  See infra notes 260-69 and accompanying text.  
 250. I.R.C. § 162(m)(1)-(3) (2006) provides that publicly traded corporations may not deduct 
compensation in excess of $1 million paid to the chief executive officer or the four highest paid 
officers other than the chief executive.  However, this limitation does not apply to performance-
based compensation.  Performance-based compensation is defined as any remuneration payable 
solely on account of the attainment of one or more performance goals I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (2006).  
Such performance goals must be determined ex ante, and certified ex post, by an independent 
compensation committee of the board of directors and approved by the shareholders.  I.R.C. § 
162(m)(4)(C)(i)-(iii) (2006).  The regulations interpreting this provision provide that compensation 
attributable to stock options is deemed to be performance-based if, inter alia, the amount of 
compensation the employee could receive is based solely on an increase in the value of the stock 
after the date of grant or award.  Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A) (1995).  Therefore, at-the-
money or out-of-the-money options are considered performance-based while in-the-money options 
are not, and no distinction is made between stock appreciation caused by market forces and firm-
specific appreciation.  In effect, any appreciation in the stock is considered performance-based.  The 
regulations provide certain limitations on option cancellations and re-pricings.  If options are 
cancelled and reissued due to a decline in the stock price, then the cancelled options are counted 
toward the maximum number of shares, with respect to which the options may be granted under the 
plan.  Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(B) (1995).  Likewise, if options are re-priced, the regulations 
deem the original options to have been cancelled and new options issued.  Id.  The regulations 
provide exceptions for re-pricings that are prompted by certain corporate recapitalizations.  See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(3)(iii)(C) (1995); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-51-018 (Sept. 18, 2000).  
Senator Carl Levin has introduced legislation that would subject nonqualified stock option 
compensation to the $1 million compensation limit.  See supra note 239.  Recent legislation and 
Treasury regulations have reduced the $1 million limitation to $500,000 in the case of financial 
institutions participating in certain federal programs.  See supra note 47 and accompanying text.  
 251. In 1993 the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued an exposure draft that would 
have required that the issuance of compensatory stock options be accounted for as an expense in an 
amount determined under fair market value models.  The business community in general and the 
technology industry in particular fought the proposal vehemently.  The Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, under pressure from Congress, relented.  See generally Melone, supra note 2, at 
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The option recipient obtains the benefits of tax deferral.  Nonqualified 
stock options are subject to taxation in accordance with tax principles 
applicable to compensatory transfers of property in general.252  However, 
Treasury regulations provide that, with respect to the receipt of 
compensatory stock options, the incidence of taxation is postponed until 
such time that the options are exercised or are otherwise disposed of—if, 
at the time the options are granted, they have no readily ascertainable 
fair market value.253  Compensatory stock options are rarely subject to 
tax when granted.254   
Due to the symmetry that Section 83 creates between the timing 
and amount of the employee’s income inclusion and the employer’s 
deduction, the benefit of the employee’s income deferral is offset by the 
concomitant deferral of the employer’s deduction.  From the employee’s 
perspective, the advantage of tax deferral is equivalent to an exemption 
from tax on investment earnings on the after-tax compensation amount 
that would have been received had compensation not been deferred.255  
Stock options exaggerate this benefit due to the leverage inherent in such 
 
554-58.  In the aftermath of the corporate scandals that came to light earlier this decade public 
sentiment turned markedly negative about the levels of executive compensation and efforts to 
require expensing such options gained traction.  The Financial Accounting Standards Board issued a 
new standard that requires expensing of options effective, for most public companies, for interim 
and annual reporting periods beginning after June 15, 2005.  See SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, 
Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards. No. 123 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2004).  Recently 
introduced legislation would conform the employer’s tax treatment of such options to their 
treatment for financial accounting purposes.  See supra note 239.  
 252. The extent of the relative deferral and conversion benefits enjoyed by recipients of 
compensatory stock options vary depending on whether the options are qualified or nonqualified.  
Qualified stock options are of two types: incentive stock options and those granted pursuant to an 
employee stock purchase plan.  The recipient of an incentive stock option does not recognize 
taxable income upon either the grant of the option or its exercise.  Rather, the incidence of taxation 
is postponed until the option holder disposes of the stock acquired through the exercise of the 
option, at which time the income is taxed at capital-gain rates.  See infra notes 260-278 and 
accompanying text.   
 253. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a) (2004).  The regulations make clear that the incidence of taxation 
is postponed until the date of exercise even though the option’s value is readily ascertainable prior 
to exercise but after the date of grant.  Id. 
 254. An option has an ascertainable fair market value if it is either actively traded on an 
established market or is transferable by the option holder, is immediately exercisable, and if the 
underlying property that is the subject of the option is subject to no restriction that has a significant 
effect on such property’s value.  Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(b) (2004).  Section 83(b) elections, discussed 
at supra notes 246-248 and accompanying text, can have relevance to recipients of stock options.  
Such an election may be advantageous if the stock received upon exercise of the options is subject 
to a substantial risk of forfeiture at the time of exercise.  
 255. See David I. Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 695, 
709-10 (2005). 
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instruments.256  The tax benefits available to the employee may be 
captured by the employer or the government, or both.257  The deferral 
benefits that attach to compensatory stock options are directly 
attributable to the fact that such options’ value is not ascertainable at the 
 
 256. Tax deferral mimics the exemption of income on after-tax earnings.  Therefore, the 
benefits of tax deferral increase as the rate of return on investment increases.  For example, if an 
employee receives $1,000 in cash compensation she will retain, assuming a 30 percent tax rate, 
$700.  Assume that the $700 were invested in employer stock and held for five years at which point 
the stock has doubled in value.  Assuming a 15% capital gains tax the employee will be left with 
$1295 (gross proceeds of $1400 less capital gains tax of $105).  Alternatively, if the employee 
deferred the compensation for five years at which time the amount deferred doubled in value then 
the employee would incur a tax of $600 (30 percent of $2,000), leaving the employee with $1,400.  
The difference between the two amounts is the amount of the tax incurred on the gain that resulted 
from the investment purchased with after-tax dollars, or $105.  Deferred compensation is 
disadvantageous during a period of falling asset values.  See Walker, supra note 255, at 715-17 
(noting that the disadvantages are mitigated by the limitations imposed on the use of capital losses 
and the possibility that the terms of the stock option grant may be adjusted ex-post).  
 257. A deferred-compensation arrangement frees up employer cash that otherwise would have 
been used to compensate employees.  If the employer invests the cash in operations, any increase in 
operating earnings would increase taxable income and the tax on such increase would offset some of 
the tax savings enjoyed by the employee.  Alternatively, the employer may use such cash to 
purchase its own shares or options on such shares in which case the return on the invested cash is 
tax-free causing the U.S. Treasury to bear the burden of the tax savings.  See I.R.C. § 1032 (2006).  
Corporations with significant net operating losses will also avoid tax on investment earnings, 
regardless of the source of such earnings.  If the employer causes the employee to bear the entire 
cost of the deferred deduction—the global contracting model—then the only difference, to the 
employee, between the receipt of taxable compensation and deferred compensation is the difference 
between the employee’s after-tax rate of return and the employer’s after-tax rate of return.  
Professors Hall and Liebman of Harvard University analyzed the tax benefits of deferral from a 
“global contracting” perspective.  Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive 
Compensation, TAX POL’Y & ECON. 1, 14 (2000) (attributing the term “global contracting” to 
MYRON SCHOLES & MARK WOLFSON, TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY (1992)).  This perspective 
assumes that a corporation will hold its after-tax cost constant and is, therefore, indifferent between 
paying compensation today or investing the compensation amount for a period and paying the 
compensation and the cumulative returns at the end of such period.  Assume that an executive could 
presently receive $1 million in taxable compensation, the executive’s personal marginal tax rate is 
pt, and the corporation’s marginal tax rate is ct.  The executive’s and the corporation’s after-tax rate 
of return on investments is rp and rc, respectively.  If the corporation pays the compensation 
currently its cost, in present value terms, is the after-tax cost of the compensation, or $1 million * 
(1-ct).  If the corporation defers payment its after-tax cost in n years is ($1 million*(1+rc)n) * (1-ct).  
In present value terms, however, the after tax cost is (($1 million*(1+rc)n) * (1-ct)) ÷ (1+rc)n  
which is exactly the same as the cost of paying the compensation in taxable form or $1 million * (1-
ct).  For the executive, the difference between the amounts accumulated after n years under each 
scenario is a function of the difference between the executive’s personal rate of return on 
investments and the rate of return earned by the corporation.  An executive that received $1 million 
in current compensation would accumulate, in after-tax dollars, $1 million * (1-pt)*(1+rp)n after n 
years.  Under the deferred compensation arrangement the amount that such executive would receive 
is $1 million* (1-pt)*(1+rc)n.  For example, if personal tax rates are expected to decline or, due to 
personal idiosyncrasies, an executive can time the exercise of options in a low tax year, the benefits 
of the deferral will increase.  
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time of grant.  Consequently, the transaction remains open until such 
options are exercised at which time the resulting income is taxed as 
compensation.258  As a result, option exercises often lead to 
extraordinarily large amounts of income to the holders of options and 
equally large deductions to the grantor corporation.259 
3.  Incentive Stock Options 
The recipient of an incentive stock option does not recognize taxable 
income upon either the grant of the option or its exercise.260  Instead, the 
incidence of taxation is postponed until the option holder disposes of the stock 
acquired through the exercise of the option.261  Consequently, incentive stock 
options offer the employee the ability to defer tax indefinitely.  Moreover, the 
tax incurred upon disposition of the stock, if such transaction results in a gain, 
will be taxed at capital gain rates.262  Thus, these options offer, in addition to 
tax deferral, the ability to convert compensation income into favorably taxed 
capital gains.263  The quid pro quo for such favorable treatment of the option 
 
 258. Compensatory stock options issuances are rare examples of transactions that have Internal 
Revenue Service imprimatur for “open transaction” treatment.  See supra note 106 and 
accompanying text. 
 259. Cisco Systems reported a tax benefit of approximately $2.5 billion for its fiscal year ended 
July 2000 resulting from compensation deductions attributable to the exercise of employee stock 
options.  See Michelle Hanlon & Terry Shevlin, Accounting for Tax Benefits of Employee Stock 
Options and Implications for Research, 16 ACCT. HORIZONS 1, 1-2 (2002).  Legislation introduced 
in 2007 would alter the employer’s tax treatment of nonqualified stock options.  See supra note 239.  
 260. I.R.C. § 421(a)(1) (2006).  The I.R.S. has issued proposed regulations that would subject 
the exercise of incentive stock options to Federal Insurance Contribution Act and Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act tax liability.  See generally Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 31.3121(a)-1(k), 
31.3306(b)-1(l), 31.3401(a)-1(b)(15), 66 Fed. Reg. 57023 (Nov. 14, 2001).  Representative 
Houghton and Senator Clinton, both from New York, have sponsored legislation to prevent the 
imposition of payroll taxes upon exercise of incentive stock options.  See H.R. 2695, 107th Cong. 
(2001); S. 1383, 107th Cong. (2001).   
 261. I.R.C. § 421 (a)(1) (2006).  The employee’s holding period for the stock commences on 
the exercise date.  See I.R.C. § 422(a) (2006).  It is possible for I.R.C. § 83 to apply in situations 
where the stock acquired upon the exercise of incentive stock options is subject to a substantial risk 
of forfeiture.  A recent Ninth Circuit case dealt with alternative-minimum tax issues arising from the 
exercise of incentive stock options for which an I.R.C. § 83(b) election was made.  In that case, a 
portion of the shares the taxpayer received upon the exercise of the incentive stock options were 
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.  The taxpayer made a § 83(b) election and, therefore, was 
subject to the alternative-minimum tax on the spread between the exercise price and the fair market 
value of the shares on all his shares, including those that were not vested.  Subsequently, the 
taxpayer forfeited the unvested shares and sold them back to the employer at cost, thereby 
increasing his capital loss.  See infra note 278.   
 262. See I.R.C. § 1222(3) (2006); David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile 
Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440, 466-67 (2000). 
 263. See I.R.C. § 1222 (2006). 
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holder is the inability of the option grantor to deduct any amounts associated 
with the compensatory option grant.264 
Internal Revenue Code Section 422 provides the statutory 
framework for incentive stock options.265  Stringent requirements are 
imposed on such plans and several limitations are placed on both the 
grantor and option holder.266  In order to qualify as an incentive stock 
option, the option must be granted by the employer’s corporation 
pursuant to a shareholder-approved plan.267  Options under such plans 
must be granted within ten years from the earlier of the date such plan is 
adopted or approved by the shareholders and must be exercisable within 
ten years from the date of grant.268  The option’s strike price cannot be 
less than the underlying stock’s fair market value.269  In addition, the 
options must be nontransferable and exercisable only by the 
employee.270 
The aggregate fair market value of stock with respect to which such 
options are exercisable in any calendar year may not exceed $100,000.271  
This limitation accounts for their relative insignificance as a component 
of executive compensation.  A further restriction is placed on the option 
holder that restricts her flexibility in disposing of any stock acquired 
through exercise of such options.  The holder of stock acquired through 
the exercise of an incentive stock option may not dispose of such shares 
within two years of the date the option was granted, nor within one year 
 
 264. I.R.C. § 421(a)(2) (2006). 
 265. See I.R.C. § 422 (b) (2006). 
 266. See infra note 267 and accompanying text. 
 267. I.R.C. § 422(b)(1) (2006).  In the case of an affiliated group of corporations, the options 
may be granted by the parent corporation or any subsidiary corporation despite the fact that such 
issuing corporation does not employ the recipient of the option.  I.R.C. § 422(b) (2006). 
 268. I.R.C. § 422(b)(2)-(3) (2006). 
 269. I.R.C. § 422(b)(4) (2006).  Failure to meet this requirement will not disqualify the option 
if such failure resulted from a good faith attempt to value the underlying stock. I.R.C. § 422(c)(1) 
(2006). 
 270. I.R.C. § 422(b)(5) (2006).  While the section does provide an exception for testamentary 
dispositions, there is no exception made for transfers pursuant to a divorce. Id.  Individuals 
possessing more than 10 percent of the combined voting power of all classes of employer stock are 
ineligible to receive such options unless the option’s strike price is at least 110 percent of the 
underlying stock’s fair market value and the option is not exercisable prior to the expiration of five 
years from the date of its grant.  I.R.C. §§ 422(b)(6), 422(c)(5) (2006). 
 271. Id.  If this limit is exceeded, then the options that exceed the limit, determined by order of 
grant, are not eligible for incentive stock option treatment.  In the event this limit is exceeded the 
employer should specifically state that part of the options, to the extent of the limitation, are 
incentive options and the excess options are nonqualified.  See I.R.S. Notice 87-49, 1987-2 C.B. 
355.  The transfer agent should issue separate stock certificates identifying which stock was 
acquired through the exercise of the incentive stock options.  See id. 
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after the exercise of the option.272  If the option holder disposes of the 
stock prior to the expiration of the aforementioned period, then such 
option is treated as a nonqualified option and the holder recognizes 
income on the exercise of the option, and the employer corporation 
generates a deduction equal to the amount the holder recognizes as 
income.273   
The alternative-minimum tax provides a potential burden to 
incentive stock option holders.  A detailed discussion of the alternative-
minimum tax is beyond the scope of this work.  In brief, the alternative-
minimum tax is imposed if the taxpayer’s tentative minimum tax 
exceeds her regular tax liability.274  The tax base, for this purpose, is the 
taxpayer’s taxable income adjusted by certain statutorily defined items 
and increased for certain tax preference items.275  In essence, this system 
was designed to ensure that taxpayers making use of favorable tax 
provisions incurred at least some tax liability.276  The ability to defer the 
incidence of taxation beyond the time of the option’s exercise is not 
available for alternative-minimum tax purposes.277  As a consequence, 
taxpayers subject to the alternative-minimum tax lose a portion of their 
deferral benefits.  Such taxpayers, however, are entitled to a minimum 
tax credit, but such credit is limited to use in years in which the taxpayer 
 
 272. I.R.C. § 422(a)(1) (2006).  Moreover, the option holder must exercise such option within 
three months of termination of employment.  I.R.C. § 422(a)(2) (2006). 
 273. I.R.C. § 421(b) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a) (1978).  If the value of the stock has 
decreased between the time the option was exercised and the time of the stock’s disposition, then 
the amount the employee must include in income, and the employer may deduct, is limited to the 
amount realized on the sale of the stock.  I.R.C. § 422(c)(2) (2006).  This is favorable for the 
employee because it prevents the employee from recognizing a larger amount of compensation and 
recognizing an offsetting capital loss that may or may not be currently deductible.  
 274. See Warren Rojas, Outdated AMT Claims First Victims of the 21st Century, 91 TAX 
NOTES 691, 692 (2001) (describing the alternative-minimum tax with regard to incentive stock 
options as a tax on the amount representing the difference between the option’s exercise price and 
the fair market value of the stock when the option is exercised). 
 275. See id. (stating that, with regard to incentive stock options, the amount representing the 
difference between the exercise price of the option and the fair market value of the stock when the 
option is exercised results in an increase in tax debt since it is subject to the alternative-minimum 
tax, even though the employee has not actually received any extra money). 
 276. For individual taxpayers, the tentative minimum tax is determined by applying a 26% tax 
rate to the first $175,000 of alternative-minimum taxable income and a 28% rate to alternative-
minimum taxable income in excess of $175,000.  I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006).  The alternative-
minimum tax is not an “add-on” tax as such.  In essence, it is an alternative tax system with reduced 
preferences and separate tax accounting rules.  Adjustments to taxable income arising from the 
application of different tax accounting rules will not alter the amount of income or deduction 
resulting from a transaction over time but do alter the timing of the recognition of such income or 
deduction.  A credit mechanism is in place that allows a taxpayer to recoup past alternative-
minimum tax payments that resulted from such timing differences.  
 277. I.R.C. § 56(b)(3) (2006). 
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incurs only regular tax liability and its use is limited to the amount of 
such liability.278  
The recapture of equity-based compensation from an employee by 
an employer pursuant to a clawback provision implicates many of the 
same tax issues discussed above in connection with the clawback of cash 
compensation.  In the event that the employee has not yet realized 
income for tax purposes, the forfeiture of such income will have no tax 
consequences.  For example, the forfeiture of restricted stock which has 
not yet vested and for which no election under I.R.C. Section 83(b) had 
been made will be a non-event for federal income tax purposes.279  
Similarly, the forfeiture of compensatory stock options will have no tax 
consequences.280  In situations where the employee has recognized 
income from the receipt of property whether the subsequent forfeiture of 
such income allows the employee to utilize the benefits of I.R.C. Section 
1341 will depend on the resolution of issues similar to those discussed 
above with respect to cash compensation.281   
Despite the similarities in tax consequences between the forfeiture 
of cash compensation and equity-based compensation, there are unique 
 
 278. See I.R.C. § 55 (2006).  The statutes governing the alternative-minimum tax do not 
address whether the capital-loss limitations imposed by I.R.C. §§ 1211 and 1212 apply for 
alternative-minimum tax purposes.  In 2006, the Tax Court, in Merlo v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 
205 (2006), held that the capital-loss limitations imposed by I.R.C. §§ 1211 and 1212 do indeed 
apply for purposes of determining the alternative-minimum tax thereby denying the taxpayer’s 
alternative-minimum tax net operating loss deduction.  A federal district court held likewise.  See 
Norman v. United States, 2006-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P50,429, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52,609 (N. D. 
Ca. 2006), aff’d. 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 16207 (9th Cir. 2008).  Merlo was affirmed by the Fifth 
Circuit.  Merlo v. Comm’r, 492 F. 3d. 618 (5th Cir. 2007).  The Ninth Circuit recently joined the 
Fifth Circuit in holding that the capital-loss limitations do indeed apply for alternative-minimum tax 
purposes.  See Kadillak v. Comm’r, 534 F. 3d. 1197 (9th Cir. 2008).  The Tax Extenders and 
Alternative-minimum tax Relief Act of 2008, part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008, abated all alternative-minimum tax liability, interest, and penalties resulting from the exercise 
of incentive stock options outstanding on October 3, 2008, and provides a limited credit for interest 
and penalties already paid that would have been abated had they not been paid.  The Tax Extenders 
and Alternative-minimum tax Relief Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 103(b), 122 Stat. 3765, 
3864 (2008) (adding § 53(f) to the I.R.C.).  
 279. Property subject to substantial risk of forfeiture is not taxable until such substantial risk of 
forfeiture lapses.  I.R.C. § 83(b) allows the property recipient to include the value of the property 
received in income at the time of its receipt notwithstanding the fact that is subject to forfeiture.  See 
supra notes 246-248 and accompanying text.  
 280. So long as the exercise price of the stock options equals or exceeds the fair market value 
of the underlying stock on the date of the options’ grant, no taxable income is recognized by the 
option recipient.  Instead, income recognition is postponed until the options are exercised.  See 
supra note 253 and accompanying text.  
 281. See supra notes 220-227 and accompanying text.  
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tax issues presented by the forfeiture of equity-based compensation.282  
As previously discussed, I.R.C. Section 83(b) allows the recipient of 
property subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture the option to include in 
income, in the year such property is received, the value of the property at 
the time of its receipt.283  The election to accelerate the income inclusion 
from the receipt of property has its greatest benefit in situations where 
the property appreciates between the time of its grant and the time the 
substantial risk of forfeiture lapses.284  In such cases, the recipient of the 
property is taxed based on the property’s lower value at the time of grant 
and the incidence of taxation on the appreciation of the property is 
deferred until such time as the property is sold.  Moreover, assuming the 
existence of favorable capital gain rates, the appreciation will be taxed at 
lower rates.  However, the benefit of I.R.C. Section 83(b) comes at a 
price. 
In addition to the fact that an election under I.R.C. Section 83(b) 
accelerates the time at which a property transaction is taxable, no 
deduction is available upon the subsequent forfeiture of the property.285  
For example, assume that an executive was granted 10,000 shares of 
employer stock with a fair market value of $500,000 in 2009. Under the 
terms of the grant, the stock vests if certain performance metrics are met 
for the employer’s fiscal year ending June 30, 2010.  If the executive 
makes the I.R.C. Section 83(b) election she will recognize $500,000 of 
income in 2009.  In the absence of such an election and assuming that 
the performance metrics are met, she will recognize compensation 
 
 282. Generally, the forfeiture of nonqualified stock options will not create any tax 
consequences because the recipient of the options is not taxed at the time the options are granted or 
vested.  Instead, the incidence of taxation is postponed until such time as the options are exercised.  
See supra note 253 and accompanying text.  However, if the option itself were subject to tax 
because it had a readily ascertainable fair market value, then the tax consequences that would result 
from forfeiture of the options would be similar to those that would result from the forfeiture of the 
underlying stock itself.  Id. 
 283. See supra notes 246-248 and accompanying text.  
 284. Assuming constant income tax rates, the election will prove beneficial so long as the 
property appreciates at a rate that compensates the recipient for the time value of the funds used to 
pay the tax earlier than necessary.  In the event that tax rates decrease between the time that the 
property is received and the time that the substantial risk of forfeiture lapses, the property will have 
to appreciate at a rate sufficient to compensate for both the time value of money and the differential 
in the tax rate in order for the election to have been worthwhile.  In the event that tax rates increase 
between the time the property is received and the time the substantial risk of forfeiture lapses, the 
property will have to appreciate at a rate sufficient to compensate for the time value of money less 
the differential in the tax rate in order for the election to have been worthwhile.  
 285. I.R.C. § 83(b)(1) (2006).  In the event that the recipient of property paid for the property, a 
capital loss is recognized upon the property’s forfeiture in an amount equal to the amount paid for 
the property less any amount realized upon the property’s forfeiture.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(a) 
(1978). 
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income in 2010 equal to the value of the stock on the date of vesting in 
2010.  If the election is made and the performance metrics are not met, 
then no deduction is permitted in 2010 when the stock is forfeited.  
Consequently, the employee will recognize $500,000 of income which 
she will not receive.  Section 1341 provides no relief in this situation for 
two reasons.  First, Section 1341 requires that the amount in question be 
deductible, which, due to Section 83(b), it is not.286  Second, the 
employee has no apparent right to the income in the year of the 
election.287  A Section 83(b) election causes the employee to recognize 
income in the face of a substantial risk of forfeiture.  At the time of the 
election the employee is fully aware of such risk and, therefore, cannot 
claim that such income was received under an apparent claim of right.      
Less clear is the result that arises if the forfeiture occurs due to a 
restatement of the metrics after the stock purportedly vested.  Assume, 
for example, that the performance metrics for the fiscal year ended June 
30, 2010 were met.  As a result, the stock award vested.  Assume further, 
however, that the results of fiscal year 2010 are restated at some point in 
2011 and that the performance metrics, after restatement, are not met, 
triggering a clawback of the stock.  It is not clear whether the deduction 
prohibition of I.R.C. Section 83(b)(2) applies in this situation.  An 
argument can be made that the stock award vested and, therefore, 
Section 83(b) no longer controls.  Alternatively, had the metrics been 
measured properly, the stock would have never vested thereby triggering 
the deduction prohibition pursuant to I.R.C. Section 83(b)(2).  The 
regulations issued under I.R.C. Section 83 would appear to favor the 
former argument.  
In effect, two risks of forfeiture are present.  The first risk is that 
the performance metrics are not met.  This clearly is deemed a 
substantial risk of forfeiture under the regulations.  The second risk is 
that, after vesting, the clawback provision is triggered due to some event, 
such as a restatement of the metrics.  This would not appear to be a 
substantial risk of forfeiture under the regulations.288  In the event the 
property recipient did not make the I.R.C. Section 83(b) election, she 
would have been subject to tax on the receipt of the property in 2010 and 
the risk of forfeiture due to possible restatement would have been 
 
 286. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.  
 287. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.  
 288. The regulations do not deal expressly with the possibility of restatements. However, the 
examples provided indicate that events that do not commonly occur or that are subject to the control 
of the employee are not considered substantial risks of forfeiture.  See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.83-
3(b)(2) (2005). 
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ignored.  Therefore, if the property would have been subject to tax under 
Section 83 in any event prior to its forfeiture, then any loss due to such 
forfeiture should fall outside the scope of I.R.C. Section 83(b)’s 
deduction prohibition.  
Despite the fact that the forfeiture of compensation under these 
circumstances may be deductible notwithstanding Section 83(b), it 
would appear that I.R.C. Section 1341 relief would, nonetheless, be 
unavailable.  If no I.R.C. Section 83(b) election was made, then I.R.C. 
Section 1341 could potentially be applicable because at the time the 
income was received the recipient had an apparent right to such 
income.289  However, accelerating the income to a time when the 
property received was subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture would 
appear to preclude any notion that the recipient had an apparent right to 
the income.  In the above example, the employee may have had an 
apparent right to the stock in 2010 but certainly did not have any right, 
apparent or otherwise, to the stock in 2009 when its value was included 
in income.  Section 1341 appears to be of no use in cases where the 
original incidence of taxation was accelerated due to a Section 83(b) 
election.  In the event the property is forfeited due to its failure to vest, 
Section 1341 would be inapplicable because no deduction is allowed for 
the forfeiture.  In the event the property vests but is later forfeited, 
Section 1341 would be unavailable because the income was originally 
recognized while it was subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture and, 
thus, the recipient had no apparent right to such income.  
The forfeiture of equity compensation also raises issues regarding 
the nature of the forfeiture transaction for tax purposes.  In the event that 
a Section 83(b) election is in effect and the property is forfeited while 
such property is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, the tax 
consequences are straightforward.  No deduction is available to the 
employee upon the forfeiture of the property and any capital loss is 
limited to the excess of the amount paid, if any, for the property by the 
employee over the amount realized by the employee upon the property’s 
disposition.290  However, if the property has substantially vested prior to 
forfeiture, these rules are inapplicable.291  Consequently, a deduction 
should be available to the employee.  However, unlike the repayment of 
cash compensation, the tax consequences of the forfeiture of equity-
flavored compensation are not so predictable.  It is very unlikely that the 
 
 289. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.  
 290. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra notes 288-289 and accompanying text 
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value of the shares forfeited will be equal to their value at the time such 
shares were included in income.  Conceivably, the forfeiture of the 
shares represents a sale or exchange of the shares in settlement of a 
liability to the employer resulting in a deduction in an amount equal to 
the value of the shares at the time of forfeiture and a capital gain or loss 
equal to the subsequent appreciation or depreciation, as the case may be, 
of the shares.  For example, assume that an employee received shares 
worth $100,000 at the time they substantially vested and were included 
in income.  One year later the shares are forfeited when they are worth 
$125,000.  Arguably, the employee is entitled to a $125,000 deduction 
accompanied by a $25,000 capital gain.292  However, the regulations 
make clear that any loss that occurs from a forfeiture after the property 
has substantially vested is an ordinary loss equal to the amount that the 
employee included in income.293  Consequently, in the above example, 
the employee would be entitled to an ordinary loss of $100,000. 
In the event that the clawback extends to the profit generated from 
the sale of stock, then the Arrowsmith doctrine would come into play.294  
Consequently, the executive would realize a capital loss on the 
repayment of such profits.  Due to the limitations on the use of capital 
losses, the applicability of Section 1341 is of heightened importance in 
such situations.  Whether the benefits of Section 1341 are available will 
depend on the circumstances surrounding the clawback and whether 
such circumstances allow for the application of this provision.  
 
 292. Under the regulations a forfeiture of property while such property is substantially non-
vested is treated as a sale or exchange of the forfeited property for which any loss realized is limited 
to the excess of the amount paid for the property over the amount realized upon the forfeiture.  
However, these regulations apply to forfeitures of substantially non-vested property for which a 
I.R.C. § 83(b) election was made.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(a) (1978). 
 293. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(e) (2003).  In the event that the employee paid for the property, any 
loss attributable to the amount paid would be a capital loss.  The regulations deal explicitly only 
with the amount of basis attributable to the employee’s income inclusion.  It would appear that the 
approach taken by Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(a), discussed at supra note 292, would apply in the event 
that substantially vested property is forfeited and that a capital loss would realized upon forfeiture 
equal to the excess of the amount paid for the property over the amount realized upon forfeiture.  
Therefore, if the stock forfeited were acquired pursuant to the exercise of a nonqualified stock 
option, then the loss attributable to the exercise price of the option would be a capital loss.  The loss 
attributable to the stock’s basis that resulted from the income inclusion caused by the exercise of the 
option would be an ordinary loss.  
 294. See supra notes 153-164 and accompanying text.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
expressly covers such profits.  See supra note 38 and accompanying text.  It is quite possible that 
contractual clawback provisions could also cover such profits.  
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Incentive stock options are often used as a compensation vehicle 
for lower-level management and other personnel.295  As previously 
discussed, incentive stock options are favorably taxed to their recipients 
but are subject to significant limitations that are not applicable to non-
qualified options.  Similar to non-qualified stock options, incentive stock 
options may be subject to conditions that create a substantial risk of 
forfeiture.296  Moreover, it appears that the language in the regulations is 
broad enough to allow these instruments to be subject to clawback 
provisions.297  For regular income tax purposes, the forfeiture of 
incentive stock options poses little difficulty.  In the event that the 
incentive stock option is forfeited prior to exercise, its forfeiture is a 
non-event, for tax purposes.  The grant of the option is not taxable and, 
therefore, its forfeiture has no income tax consequences.298  Likewise, 
forfeiture prior to exercise would not implicate any alternative-minimum 
tax issues because this tax is implicated only upon the exercise of the 
incentive stock option.299  
Forfeiture of stock acquired by the exercise of an incentive stock 
option would not yield any deduction to the employee because, unlike 
non-qualified options, the exercise of incentive stock options does not 
generate any compensation income.300  Therefore, upon forfeiture of the 
stock the employee would realize a capital loss equal to the difference 
between the amount of the employee’s basis in the stock and the amount 
realized upon its forfeiture.  Among the requirements for the application 
of the favorable tax rules enjoyed by holders of incentive stock options 
 
 295. The annual $100,000 limitation on the aggregate fair market value of stock with respect to 
which incentive stock options are exercisable limits their utility as a tool for  compensating upper 
management.  See supra note 278 and accompanying text.  
 296. See Treas. Reg. § 1.422-5(d)(1) (2004). 
 297. The regulations provide that “[a]n option does not fail to be an incentive stock option 
merely because the option is subject to a condition . . . .”  Id.  Given the limitations on the amounts 
that may be granted under incentive stock option plans, it is not all that common for incentive stock 
options to be subject to clawback provisions.  These instruments are commonly issued to middle 
management and rank and file employees and, although they may be subject to vesting restrictions, 
it is rare for issuances to these employees to be conditioned on performance metrics.  Note that in 
order for an option to qualify as an incentive stock option it must, among other requirements, be 
exercised while the option holder is an employee or have been exercised no later than three months 
after the option holder’s termination of employment.  The three-month grace period is extended to 
one year in the event the option holder’s employment ceased due to permanent and total disability.  
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.422-1(a)(1)(i)(B); 1.422-1(a)(3) (2004).  
 298. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.  
 299. Unlike non-qualified stock options, the exercise of incentive stock options is not a taxable 
event for regular income tax purposes.  However, the difference between the fair market value of 
the underlying shares and the options’ exercise price is taxable for alternative-minimum tax 
purposes.  See supra note 277 and accompanying text.  
 300. See supra notes 260-261 and accompanying text 
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is that the stock acquired through the exercise of the option not be 
disposed of prior to two years after the grant of the option and one year 
after the exercise of the option.301  Although the regulations do not 
expressly address it, it would appear that a forfeiture within this period 
would be considered a disqualifying disposition.  A disqualifying 
disposition would result in the option being subject to tax under the 
general rules of Section 83 and recognition of compensation income in 
the year of such disqualifying disposition.302  Under general rules, the 
forfeiture would cause the option holder to recognize compensation 
income that would be offset by a concomitant deduction as a result of 
the forfeiture.303  However, the regulations contain a special rule that 
prevents this result.  Under this rule, the amount of compensation 
income to be recognized by the employee upon a disqualifying 
disposition is limited to the amount of gain recognized by the employee 
upon the disposition.304  Because it is very unlikely that any gain would 
result from such forfeiture, no compensation income—nor related 
deduction—would be recognized by the employee upon such a 
forfeiture.  
The application of the alternative-minimum tax complicates the tax 
consequences of forfeitures of incentive stock options.  The spread 
between the fair market value of the stock and the exercise price of the 
incentive stock option at the time of exercise is taxable for alternative-
minimum tax purposes.305  Thus, for alternative-minimum tax purposes, 
these instruments resemble non-qualified stock options.  Forfeiture of 
incentive stock options prior to their exercise would create no 
alternative-minimum tax consequences because the grant of such options 
is not taxable for alternative-minimum tax purposes.  
However, unlike the consequences for regular income tax purposes, 
forfeiture of the stock acquired through the exercise of incentive stock 
options creates tax consequences similar to those encountered from the 
forfeiture of stock acquired through the exercise of non-qualified stock 
options.306  Consequently, in the absence of a Section 83(b) election, 
 
 301. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.  
 302. See Treas. Reg. § 1.421-2(b)(1) (2004). 
 303. Neither the rescission doctrine nor the Merrill doctrine would appear to apply in this case.  
These doctrines have limited application and the acquisition of stock through the exercise of an 
option, and the subsequent forfeiture of that stock, does not constitute the rescission of a contract.  
Moreover, the Merrill doctrine applies to income erroneously received and acknowledged as such in 
the same taxable year as its receipt.  See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text.  
 304. See Treas. Reg. § 1.422-1(b)(2)(i) (2004).  
 305. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.  
 306. See supra notes 279-294 and accompanying text.  
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forfeiture of the stock would lead to a deduction, for purposes of the 
alternative-minimum tax, as a result of the forfeiture.  The benefit of this 
deduction may be illusory, however.  If the taxpayer is not subject to the 
alternative-minimum tax, then no direct current benefit would be 
obtained from the deduction.  Such a deduction may, however, increase 
the amount of the minimum tax credit available against the taxpayer’s 
regular tax liability.307  The minimum tax credit is available to offset a 
taxpayer’s regular tax liability but is limited to an amount equal to the 
excess of the taxpayer’s regular tax liability over the amount of the 
taxpayer’s tentative minimum tax.308  In effect, the credit will reduce the 
taxpayer’s regular tax liability up to the point where any further 
reduction would trigger the alternative-minimum tax.  As result, a 
deduction that reduces the tentative minimum tax has the effect of 
increasing the available credit for regular tax purposes.309  
Under the appropriate circumstances the taxpayer may also make 
use of Section 1341 whose benefits are broad enough to encompass the 
alternative-minimum tax.310  If the taxpayer made a Section 83(b) 
election for alternative-minimum tax purposes then, for reasons similar 
 
 307. Many of the differences between the tax bases for regular tax and alternative-minimum 
tax purposes result from timing differences in the recognition of income or expenses.  
Consequently, it is possible that taxpayers will incur a minimum tax liability in certain years and 
then incur a regular tax liability for the same items in later years.  The minimum tax credit is the 
mechanism by which attempts to ameliorate this result.  See generally I.R.C. § 53 (2006).  In effect, 
the minimum tax credit converts the alternative-minimum tax, at least in part, to a prepayment of 
the regular tax.  Timing differences are not tracked individually and, therefore, the minimum tax 
credit does not neatly track the exact effects of timing differences.  For example, it is irrelevant, for 
purposes of determining the availability of the credit, whether the timing differences that created the 
credit reversed themselves in the year in which the credit is used.  Id. 
 308. See I.R.C. § 53(c) (2006).  Notwithstanding the general limitation, a special rule allows 
taxpayers to use a minimum amount of long-term credits for tax years ending before 2013.  See 
I.R.C. § 53(e) (2006).  
 309. Intuitively, this result is appropriate.  To the extent that the exercise of the options in an 
earlier year resulted in alternative-minimum tax liability, the subsequent forfeiture of the gains from 
those options should result in recoupment of that tax liability—in this case through an increase in 
the minimum tax credit.  
 310. I.R.C. § 1341 is applicable to any taxes imposed by Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue 
Code.  I.R.C. § 1341(a) (2006).  The alternative-minimum tax is imposed under Chapter 1, 
Subchapter A, Part VI.  The application of I.R.C. § 1341 is muddled by the alternative-minimum tax 
credit.  It is quite possible that all or a portion of the alternative-minimum tax imposed in an earlier 
has already been recouped in a subsequent year or years through the use of alternative-minimum tax 
credit.  See supra note 278.  It would appear inappropriate for a taxpayer to be able to recoup the 
alternative-minimum tax paid in the year the options were exercised in toto without reduction for 
the amount of such already recouped in a subsequent year.  The statutory language is broad enough 
to prevent this result.  Section 1341 yields a reduction in tax for the current year in an amount equal 
to the decrease in tax for the prior year or years which would result from the exclusion of the gain 
from the exercise of incentive stock options.  See I.R.C. § 1341(a)(5)(B) (2006) (emphasis added).      
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to those previously discussed with respect to forfeitures of stock 
acquired through the exercise of non-qualified stock options, no 
deduction would be available upon the forfeiture of the stock and, 
accordingly, the benefits of Section 1341 would be unavailable.311  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Compensation clawback provisions are proliferating. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 provided for the clawback of certain forms of 
compensation but limited its reach to a small number of executive 
officers of publicly traded entities and required the intervention of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission for enforcement.  The rapidity 
with which large financial institutions met their demise—or averted such 
demise due to government largess—has prompted a reassessment of 
incentive compensation structures that many commentators believe 
encouraged excessive leverage and imprudent short-term risk taking.  
Legislation enacted in late 2008 and early 2009 mandated clawback 
provisions in executive compensation arrangements for firms receiving 
federal financial assistance.  Moreover, shareholders and directors, 
emboldened by the recent chain of events, have begun demanding 
greater accountability from their executives resulting in the 
implementation of clawback provisions in industries far removed from 
Wall Street and the financial sector.  Whether clawback provisions will 
lead to greater prudence on the part of management or stifle creativity 
remains to be seen. However, these provisions strike the public at large 
as a common-sense approach to achieve a measure of fairness.  
The federal income tax consequences to executives forced to repay 
or forfeit compensation is complicated—and not entirely fair.  The tax 
consequences of repaid or forfeited compensation are dependent upon 
 
 311. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.  An election pursuant to I.R.C. § 83(b) is not 
available, for regular tax purposes, for incentive stock options because such instruments are not 
taxable under I.R.C. § 83.  However, because, for alternative-minimum tax purposes, incentive 
stock options are taxable upon exercise, such an election is permissible for purposes of the 
alternative-minimum tax.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.422-1(b)(3), Example 2 (2004).  Such an election 
exposes the taxpayer to the prohibition on the deduction of losses resulting from the forfeiture of the 
stock.  See supra note 247 and accompanying text.  Although such a result may cause the taxpayer 
to have a larger capital loss on the forfeiture, the courts have held that the capital-loss limitations 
applicable to the calculation of the regular tax liability apply for alternative-minimum tax purposes.  
See supra note 278.  See id. for a discussion of the moratorium on the collection of alternative-
minimum tax liability resulting from the exercise of incentive stock options.  Note that if the 
incentive stock options were no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture but were forfeited 
pursuant to a clawback provision a deduction would be available for alternative-minimum tax 
purposes.  However, I.R.C. § 1341 would be inapplicable if an election under I.R.C. § 83(b) were in 
effect.  See supra note 289 and accompanying text.  
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the federal income tax treatment of the compensation subject to the 
clawback.  The annual accounting concept virtually assures that the tax 
benefits derived from the deduction that results from the clawback will 
not correspond to the tax burden imposed upon the executives in the year 
the compensation was received.  I.R.C. Section 1341, an ameliorative 
provision, may or may not apply depending upon the particular 
circumstances surrounding the clawback.  With respect to equity-based 
incentive compensation executives will have to rethink the desirability 
of the I.R.C. Section 83(b) election.  Although the decision to make such 
election has always required careful analysis, the potential that such 
compensation may be clawed back adds another, quite significant, factor 
to consider.  The benefits of I.R.C. Section 1341 will not apply to 
compensation for which such an election was made.  
The potential that executives will fail to come close in recouping 
the taxes paid on compensation that they cannot retain may result in 
longer deferrals of incentive compensation.  The forfeiture of untaxed 
compensation may be relatively less painful, from both a psychological 
and tax standpoint, than the repayment of previously taxed income.  To 
borrow from a famous adage: In the case of compensation it is not better 
to have been paid and lost than not to have been paid at all. 
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